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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LaVAR PARK,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
M 0 0 R M A N MANUFACTURING

COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,
and GAIL BARRON,
-

I
j

Civil No. 7456

Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As the appellant in its brief has omitted some of the
most essential facts, and has misconstrued and misstated others,
the respondent feels compelled to submit a complete statement
of facts.
The plaintiff is a poultry farmer living in Riverton, Utah,
and the defendant is a corporation with home offices in
Quincy, Illinois, which manufactures feed for livestock and
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poultry. Plaintiff bought poultry feed from the defendant
to be fed in a particular manner. A large number of the
chickens so fed died and the plaintiff sued to recover damages
for breach of express or implied warranty.
About Jan. 20, 1948, plaintiff bought and received 10,000
white leghorn baby chicks one week old from Sales and
Bourke's Hatcheries in California, and put them into his
brooding pens on the west side of Redwood Road (R. 121122). In March, 1948, he sold about 2,250 of the young birds
si:nce the maximum capacity of all his coops-East and West
of Redwood Road-was not above 7,000 mature pullets (R. 180,
198) . Before that time he had had some normal brooding
losses among his chicks, and he had sold the roosters (R. 199200, 266-267). When the pullets were 2'l2 months old, a
number of them died of chickenpox and tracheitis (R. 193,
199), so that about the middle of April plaintiff's flock consisted of about 6,400 three-month-old chickens (R. 180).
To make room for the growing pullets, plaintiff sold
all the older hens in the coops on the east side of the road in
May, 1948, and washed and disinfected their coops (R. 122144). About June 1, he moved 2,850 of the young pullets
over to the east side with the help. of a Mr. ·Cont.a; poultry.
bqyer for the Utah Poultry· Company,. a very . experienced
chicken man who had .handled "millions of chickens," his
job being to "cull'1 chickens, that is select those hens which
do 'not lay eggs and buy them as meat. By law, and the strict
rules of his company, he was, not permitted to buy any diseased
chickens (R. 304). As a result, and through his long years
of experience, he had exceptional ability to recognize disease

4
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in chickens. Mr. Conta testified that only the best layers were
selected to be moved to the east side (R. 306) and that they
were in good shape and had no diseases (R. 307-310).
Up to that time plaintiff fed all his chickens a product
of General }.fills, known as "Larro," and was satisfied with
the results. This feed was a pre-ground "mash" containing
the nutritional requirements for chickens, including protein
and minerals, in ready-mixed form, with scratch grains in
regulated quantities to be fed separately once a day. Mr.
Wood, a representative of General Mills, explained at the
trial that under their feeding program the scratch grainswheat, or wheat combined with oats or corn-are progressively
withheld from the chickens the higher their level of egg
production. At 75ro production, for example, the chickens
receive less grain than when the egg yield is lower, or when
they just start to lay. He said that chickens have a natural
preference for the grains which must be withheld from them
because with increasing production the protein requirement
increases and the carbohydrate requirement decreases (R. 362365).
Early in June, 1948, plaintiff met Gail Barron, salesman
for defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company. The first
business he had with him was a day or so later when Barron
came to plaintiff's place and sold him some minerals to stop
picking in his young birds. This picking was the ordinary
feather picking which occurs in all sizeable flocks from time
to time and is distinguished from "pick-outs" or "cannibalism"
which afflicted the hens on the east side after using defendant's
feed. Conta testified that these conditions are not the same,
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that they "are two" (R. 340). The picking did not concern
plaintiff very much and later cleared up by itself so that at
the time when he started to feed mintrate the picking was
"very nominal." (R. 181).
When Barron came to see plaintiff, his main purpose was
to sell him a new self-feed concentrate called "Poultry Mintrate 40," which his company had just put out. Barron explained that plaintiff could feed Mintrate right along with
oats, that its use would eliminate the need for the more expensive commercial pre-ground mash or obtaining grinding and
mixing machines to mix and grind up the feed himself.
Plaintiff had never heard of this product before and was
naturally skeptical at first, knowing how easily chickens can
be upset and thrown off egg production.
Mr. Barron visited plaintiff almost every day in the fore
part of June, 1948, and once spent practically the whole day
with him in an attempt to persuade him to change to the new
feeding plan. He told Park that numerous successful experiments with Mintrate on the self-feed method had been made,
that it had been proved equal or superior to any feeding
method now on the market, and that no less than 657o pw·
duction-65 eggs per 100 hens a day-had in all cases been
achieved. He added that there had been better results than
that, that 9070 production had been reached in at l~ast one
instance, and that plaintiff would in any event obtain a minimum lay of 657o on the self feed plan (R. 126-127). Barron
also said that chickens on their plan would not moult for the
full 15-months laying period (R. 408-409).
Barron showed plaintiff some literature which impressed
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him (R. 190), p~rticularly a pamphlet (Exhibit A) entitled
the '2\r\V, EASY, NO J\liX, SELF-FEED CONCENTRATE"
which states in red and black advertising, among other things:
"Compared with the average laying mash-three times as much
minerals-twice as much protein-half as much needed L1Iintrate 40 and your grain=good results- contains only
what you need, but can't raise--lower cost per bird-all the
advantages of a concentrate \vithout the work, fuss or muss"
(emphasis supplied). On the large inside page the pamphlet
gives detailed instructions on "How to use the EASY, NO
MIX, SELF-FEED WAY new feeding method for laying hens
-no grinding or mixing" (R. 137). Further down the pamphlet states:
"When not set up for grinding or mixing, the selffeed way described above may be preferred. It has
been successfully used by thousands of Moorman customers.·'' (Emphasis supplied).

The self-feed plan which Barron specifically remommended to plaintiff (R. 127, 143) is based on the idea that the
chickens will be able to balance their own diet. They have
before them at all times the mintrate concentrate in one
feeder and whole oats in another feeder and have free choice
in the amounts of each they wish to consume. In addition they
receive scratch grains (not oats, usually wheat) once a day,
and alfalfa hay (R. 137).
On his visits to plaintiff, Barron was once or twice accompanied by a Mr. McArthur, the District Sales Manager for
defendant company. McArthur was present when the statement concerning 65lf0 production and other statements as to
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the supenonty of the Mintrate plan were made (R. 134).
Plaintiff finally agreed to order some mintrate, but only enough
for .1,250 chickens (R. 189, 26}-264). That was before a
written guaranty was discussed (R. 263-264, 410).
A day or so later plaintiff and Barron began talking about
the possibility of entering into a written agreement under which
plaintiff would receive definite assurance that he would not
lose any money through the use of the 11intrate plan (R.
411) . In case such a contract could be obtained, plaintiff
agreed to feed Mintrate to 2,850 instead of the original 1,250
chickens. Mr. Barron needed some time to contact his superior
to make sure that he had authority to enter into such an agreement (R. 411). But in the meantime, on the strength of
Barron's promise to get the guaranty, if he could, plaintiff
started, about June 11, to feed Mintrate to all the 2,850
chickens on the east side of Redwood Road (R. 189).
This arrangement made it possible for plaintiff to carry
out a clear-cut test to compare the two feeds and feeding
method with respect to chickens of the same breed, the same
age and hatch which were receiving the same care, housing, and
sanitation, and were comparable in numbers. (Plaintiff then
had 3,491 "Larro" birds, all on the west side of the road).
On the basis of this test Park intended to decide which of the
two feeding methods to use in the future (R. 411).
Following the instructions of defendant, plaintiff gradually
changed over to the mintrate plan, at first mixing it with his
regular feed and increasing the portion each day until at the end
of 10 days, about June 21, the east side chickens were completely mintrate-fed (R. 142).
8
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In the meantime, 11r. Barron had contacted the District
Sales Manager McArthur. Barron testified as follows:
"A.- Yes, I called him, as I remember it. I called him
on the phone and explained to him that Mr. Park
would place 2,850 birds on our feeding plan. if
the company would insure that he would not lose
any money through it.

Q. What did he say?
A. At that time he said he could not tell me; that he
was quite sure the company would, because they
were interested in getting poultry business in this
area; and that he could not okeh it without checking further on it.

Q. Did you later have a conversation about this same
matter?
A. About a day following, Mr. McArthur contacted
me and told me . . .
A. (continued). That 11r. McCullough had approved the guaranty and that we could guarantee that
he would get the same results or have the same
production rate, the same money return from his
chickens as from the chickens on the other side"
(R. 412).
Later, l\1r. Barron testified, 11cArthur personally went
with him to plaintiff's place and told plaintiff who asked him
about the guaranty that "Mr. McCullough had approved it,
that the company was behind it'' (R. 413). McArthur's testimony is to the same effect. He said that he called McCullough,
the Sales Manager for the states of Utah, Idaho, and parts of
Nevada, and was told by him that he could guarantee the
product, that the company "would equal the production of
any competitive feed" on the self-feed method (R. 286).
9
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Mr. Barron also testified that Mr. McCullough personally
recruited him as a salesman in the middle of May, 1948, when
the company was getting ready to open up the Utah area for
the new-type feed; that McCullough pointed out to him the
selling points of Mintrate 40 and particularly the attractiveness
of the self-feed method to farmers; "that the program would
eliminate and was eliminating many of the standard types of
feeding; that it would eliminate the need for getting it through a
mash house and eliminate the need or necessity for mixing the
grain. The farmer himself could feed the grain and the protein
direct to the chicken ... "; that McCullough told him further
that "if fed on this method the chickens would not ever lay under
65lfo"; that the method was new but would be appealing to
any farmer, and that "it would eliminate the sales resistance
to the program" (R. 398-400). Later, in sales meetings in
June, Gail Barron was further instructed along the same lines,
and McCullough explained to the salesmen that chickens on
the self-feed method would not moult for the entire 15-months
laying period (R. 400). See also McArthur's testimony (R.
282-285).
The written agreement was executed on June 19, 1948
(Exhibit C, set out in full at R. 141) .
At the time the agreement was executed, the east side
chickens were already on the Mintrate feeding plan and were
just starting to lay. Plaintiff did not start to count egg collections East and West and to record them on his eggcharts until
about June 20. It was not before July 3 that egg production
was high enough to gather eggs twice daily (R. 207, 211). For
10
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about two weeks thereafter the results were good.
testified as follows:

Plaintiff

"I would say maybe the mintrate might have had
a little the better of it, for one per cent, when Mr.
Mittelberg came out there, and they got up to 63V2
per cent is the highest I ever did get out of them, out
of the pullets. That should have been around the
middle. of July. Then they started to dropping off"
(R. 144-145).
About the same time plaintiff noticed that the Mintrate
birds were losing weight. He told Barron about it and Barron
told Mr. Mittelberg, the 1fanager of the Service Department
of defendant who had come out from the head office in Illinois.
Mr. Mittelberg went to see plaintiff on July 19. He testified
that' the birds looked good and the egg production was just
about the same as that of his other birds (R. 797). He gave
plaintiff some advice on how to improve their weight (R. 418419).
About the same time Barron asked plaintiff to recommend
the feed to other farmers, but plaintiff declined because the
chickens were losing weight (R. 150-151) . Plaintiff weighed
some of the chickens, put them on scales and found the
Mintrate birds lh to % pound lighter than the other birds
on the average (R. 151). Mr. Wood, and a Mr. Bryson, who
bought eggs from plaintiff during this period, confirmed the
fact that the I\1intrate birds were getting thin (R. 357, 245).
A little later plaintiff became disturbed about the amount
of picking in the mintrate pens. He testified that there was
"a terrible lot of cannibalism," that many chickens were
11
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picked to death (R. 144). The worst outbreak started about
July 24. Plaintiff saved many by painting them with a salve,
but many died (R. 149). Mrs. Park and Mr. Miller, plaintiff's
hired man, testified to the same effect. Mr. Barron testified:

"Q. Coming back to Mr. Park, when was the next time
you saw Mr. Park?
A. I think after that, the day of the 25th or 26th of
July. It was just after the 24th.
Q. What was the occasion ?

A. He called me out there.
Q. What did you see when you got there?

A. Mr. and Mrs. Park and the hired man, they were
attempting to stop chickens from killing each
other on the east side of the road. They had an
outbreak for about three days there; he was completely discouraged with the feed.
Q. What did you tell him?

A. I told him I would notify the company of his intention and see if there was not a solution to the
problem.

Q. Did you ask him to keep feeding or stop feeding?
A. I asked him to keep feeding.
Q. Did he keep feeding?

A. He did.
Q. Did you notice what they were doing.

A. They were picking each other.
Q. What was the result of this picking, that you could
see?
A. There were deaths, a number of deaths; and of

12
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his entire 2,850 birds I would say a good 1j3 · of
them were pain~d.... They had been picked or
picked at, and he was continually painting them
to stop it.

Q. Did you yourself see any of the dead birds?
A. Yes.
Q. How many?
A. I would not know. I did not count them. There
was in one pen I counted at one runway about
fifteen birds newly dead, and in Pen No. 1-

Q. Can you point that out?
.\A. The 6-foot runway there, they were in that runway
betwe-en Pen No. 1 and 2.

Q. About how many?
A. I would say about fifteen.

Q. Were there any dead chickens anywhere else?
A. Every runway had dead chickens, but some had
more than others. I did not count them." (R.
420-421).
At the same time many of the mintrate birds went off
egg production and became culls while the Larro birds layed up
to S57o (R. 148). The culls were bought as meat by Tom
Conta (R. 156), while the chickens that had died had to be
thrown out as garbage. Plaintiff testified as follows:
·'They were giving me a bad time, and I told Gail
something had to be done. I said I had better take
them off this feed. He said 'No, you better give them
a fair cqance.'

Q. What did he say to you?

13
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A. Well, he said to leave them on this plan and we
·would see. We had to give them a fair trial. So
· I figured, well, I would have to give them a fair
trial. If I had to have any bad business with
the company, I would have to give them a fair trial,
so I l~ft them on it. I finally took them off. That
is, I started to take them off before Dr. Sturdy
came out. I think I started on Saturday, and they
came out on Monday." (R. 150).
Plaintiff said he thought he started to go back to the Larro
feed about August 18, that he changed back gradually taking
about ten days (R. 148). He did not ask a disinterested veterinarian to look at the chickens bceause a Dr. Sturdy, the defendant's own veterinarian flew out to Utah for the special purpose
of examing plaintiff's flock (R. 15 3) . McArthur testified as
to these occasions as follows:
''Mr. Barron called me during the night and told
me that there was a lot of trouble with Park's
chickens and I was down there very early the next
morning and went through the coops and looked
the chickens over. That is when I first saw the
written guaranty.
Q. About when was that -do you know?
A. I would say it was some time during August.

Q. Was that the fore part or the latter part of August?
A. I could not definitely say as to date.

Q. By the way, you said you came down and examined
the chickens?
A. Yes.

Q. What did you see?
14
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A. I saw a lot of dead chickens and a lot of chickens
picking badly.
Q. What did you do after you had examined the
chickens and knew about this guaranty?
A. I went through all of the pens and looked the
situation over, all of the pens where the chickens
were being fed mintrate, then, on the opposite
side of the street, after making a comparison I
went back to Ogden and called Mr. McCullough
and reported to him just exactly what I had seen,
and told him that I thought it was quite serious
and that he definfiitely should get some action.
He instructed me to immediately call Mr. Hulsen,
the sales manager, in Quincy, Illinois, and I did
that.
Q. What did you say to Mr. Hulsen?
A. I told him approximately what I had told Mr. McCullough. I told him that the chickens were dying, that they were losing weight, and that they
were picking bad; that as far as I knew, the feed
had been fed in accordance with our instructions;
that I had been checking the particular operation
as closely as I could and still attend to my other
work. At that time I had been in Mr. Park's place
-that was the fourth trip, I think.
Q. You had discovered the manner in which he fed
his chickens?
A. I had very definitely observed it, and I was very
much concerned about the deal.
Q. What was the name--Hulsen? What did he say?
A. He told me that the company would get someone
out here immediately.
1"5
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Q. Did they get someone out here?
A. Yes.
Q. Who came out?

A. Dr. Sturdy.

Q. When did you first see Dr. Sturdy?
A. I met him at the airport.

Q. Where did you go from there?
A. I took him to the hotel, and the next morning I
brought him up to Mr. Park's place (R. 287-288).
Mr. McArthur then relates how Dr. Sturdy examined the
chickens, and that one remark of Dr. Sturdy's struck him as
being unusual, and therefore he remembered it. He said:
e are just starving these chickens to death on all the feed
they want." (R. 290).

rrw

Plaintiff and Mr. Barron and Mr. Miller all testified that
they heard Dr. Sturdy make the same remark after he dissected
two chickens, cut open their gizzards and found them to be
full of oat fibre (R. 154-155, 422-424, 523-524). Mr. Barron
testified:
"A. He said that the gizzard was full of hulls, which
he showed us. There was nothing else in the
gizzard except oat hulls, and he said that the
chicken was starving to death, that he thought it
was full. The full gizzard made the chicken feel
as if it were full, and as a result it was not eating
enough. It was gradually starving." (R. 424).
Mr. Miller, who was particularly interested in poultry diseases because he was studying about them at school, asked

16
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Dr. Sturdy about leukosis and Dr. Sturdy said it did not show
in these chickens, and he also told him that there was no
pullorum or coccidia, nor any other disease (R. 52;,..524).
1Iiller stated:

;

I
j

"All he said was: '\Ve have been starving these
chickens to death. They feel like they are full, getting
plenty to eat, but they are not.' " (R. 524).
Dr. Sturdy himself testified as a witness for the defendant
company. He is a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine and employed by defendant as Research Veterinarian, also has some
duties in connection with the company's Experimental Farm.
\Y/hile the witness obviously avoided committing himself as
to the cause of plaintiff's difficulties, he did admit that the
chickens on the east side "just did not look too good" as
comp~red with the Larro birds (R. 717, 728-729), that there
were "quite a few culls" among them, and that they were
light in weight (R. 727), and that the consumption of too
many oats in the self-feed program may have been the cause of
the difficulties (R. 73~-734). He testified:
"~lhen I opened up the crop and gizzard I said
to 1,1r. Park: 'There is your trouble. That bird
is overeating oats. No wonder your birds are not
doing any better!

Q. That was your opinion at that time?
A. Yes."

(R. 732, see also 719).

Dr. Sturdy looked for illnesses among the flock and testified as to all the disease possibilities at great length. He said
that there was no pullorum (R. 718, 727), nor coccidia (R.
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719, 727) nor any other disease that he could positively diagnose. He suspected that there may have been a few cases of
big liver or other form of leucosis, but he was not certain
(R. 743), but added that there might be some cases of big
liver in a flock without affecting the other birds and that this
disease is entirely different from Newcastle which spreads
rapidly and usually hits all the coops on one farm (R. 729730). Dr. Sturdy testified that he was going on to California
to investigate some similar complaints (R. 735), and that on
other poultry farms in Utah that he had visited egg production
was lower on mintrate than on other feeding programs (R.
739).
After his trip to California, on August 28, Dr. Sturdy
returned and visited plaintiff's farm again (R. 725), and by
that time several other officers of defendant, including Mr.
Mittelberg and Mr. Garrison, the Regional Sales Manager
for the Pacific area, had also arrived in Salt Lake City because
of their great concern over the progress of plaintiff's feeding
experiment (R. 294, 459). There were some efforts made by
defendant to come to a settlement with plaintiff (R. 458-461),
but no adjustment finally materialized.
There was a large amount of additional testimony to
the effect that the Larro birds were doing well while the
mintrate birds went down in egg production, had many more
culls, more deaths and the quality of the eggs produced was
inferior (Mittelberg R. 807-808, Wood 356-357, 359, Keith
Bryson R. 244, 245, 247, John Miller R. 526-527). This
was apart from the testimony of other poultry men in Utah
18
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who had similar unsuccessful experiences with the Mintrate
self-feed program.

.

.(

I

There was no question but that plaintiff fed Mintrate strictly in accordance with defendant's instructions. The evidence
was also undisputed that apart from the difference in nutrition, the Mintrate and Larro chickens received absolutely
equal care, housing and sanitation, and that they were of the
same age and heredity. In that connection defendant's expert
witness, Dr. C. I. Draper, head of the Department of Poultry
of the Utah State Agricultural College, testified that where a
farmer has chickens all of the same age, raised under the same
conditions up to the age of 5 months, and then they are separated, but they continue to be under the same management,
with the same type of coop and the same amount of space and
the same care in all respects, except that one group receives
a different type of feed, and that group develops severe picking and cannibalism while the other group does not, then it
follows as a logical conclusion that the cannibalism was caused
by a nutritional deficiency (R. 773-774).
See also R. 726 showing that in Government Bulletin No.
1652 "Cannibalism," is listed under nutritional diseases. Dr.
Draper and Dr. Sturdy, however, call cannibalism not a disease,
but a "vice," not caused by any organism (R. 726, 758).
Plaintiff does not claim that there are any deleterious substances in the composition of the Mintrate feed itself. Dr. Draper testified, however that because a feed has a certain constituency that does not necessarily mean it is good for the bird (R.
766, see also Dr. Elmslie's testimony R. 644-645). Dr. Draper
10
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stated that the feeding program for chickens must be varied
according to the kind of the bird, its size, and the percentage
of its egg production (R. 768-770). The Mintrate self~feed
program does not allow for any such variation, particularly
not in relation to the level of egg production. That was admited by Mr. Mittelberg (R. 816-817).
As to the beneficial qualities of oats in feeding chickens,
there appears. to be a difference of opinion among the experts
(R. 734). Oats have more fiber than other grains and are
therefore less digestible for chickens (R. 820, 760-761). All
experts agree, however, that chickens fed on too many oats
or oats alone will deteriorate and produce very few eggs
(R. 734-735, 757, 648). Also, confined poultry such as chickens
on the larger farms of the west have different nutritional
requirements than the smalle:: family-sized or farm flocks of
the middle west which can run freely about the green of
the country (R. 815, 821).
The self-feed method itself is not generally recommended
for chickens. Dr. Draper testified that he had not seen it used
in Utah and that the Utah State Agricultural College does not
recommend it (R. 767). Dr. Miner, also of the Utah State
Agricultural College, states in a letter that the "cafeteria
method" of feeding can be carried to extremes, that it has to
be used with judgment and skill, and that for most individuals
the mixed rations are preferable (R. 762). And Mr.
Wood, representative of General Mills Farm Service Division, testified that his cotnpany does not recommend a
free choice self-feed program for chickens above the age
of 20 weeks (R. 362, 382).
20
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The defendant itself evidently began to have doubts as
to the appropriateness of the self-feed method. In September,
1948, after the occurrences at plaintiff's farm, it cautioned
against recommending a change to the self-feed method (R.
4;4-435, 809).
According to the testimony of Dr. Elmslie, Director of
Research of defendant, Poultry Mintrate 40 was not adopted
by the company before the fall of 1947 (R. 623, 634). It is
the first chicken concentrate of the company intended to be
used on the self-feed plan, the older Poultry Mintrate 38
having been developed for mash feeding only (R. 65 3). Dr.
Elmslie, who also supervises the 180-acre experimental farm
of defendant, could not point to any experiment of the company that had been made with White Leghorn chickens on
the self-feed method although they are the most widely-used
laying chickens in the United States. There also had not
been any self-feed experiments before the fall of 1947 with
any other breed of chickens except one with an "Austrowhite"
breed and one with a "High Line" breed. Only one of these
experiments was on a comparative basis, but involved only
two pens of 70 birds, and the other one covered only one pen of
75 chickens (R. 634, 635). The witness did not have any
information or figures on the results of these experiments,
neither did Mr. Mittelberg (R. 825). That was the extent of
the research and testing of the new product before it was
released to the public. The company's main business seems
to be feeds for livestock. It sells a hog mintrate, a cow
mintrate, a beef cattle mintrate, and mineral feeds for horses
and sheep (R. 626-628). Poultry Mintrate 40 is intended

21
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for turkeys as well as chickens (R. 628), but for turkeys, Dr.
Elmslie said, they do not recommend the self-feed method
(R. 632).
As a matter of fact, there is not the slightest evidence in
the whole record that there had ever been an adequate or
proper testing of the Mintrate feed or the self-feed method
by the company or any one else indicating that satisfactory
results could be obtained when fed to a larger flock. Apparently,
the plaintiff was the first person to carry out a full scale experiment on a comparative basis, which test proved conclusively
that the Mintrate, when fed on the self-feed method, was a
dismal failure.
Plaintiff did not attempt to recover damages for all the
losses of his Mintrate birds, but asked solely for compensation
of his relative or comparative loss, that is, any losses in excess
of those experienced by his Larro birds. He concedes that
there are certain risks involved in the chicken business which
are, however, due to modern advances in the science of poultry
farming, not nearly as unavoidable and unpredictable as
appellant attempts to show. Since he experienced some normal
losses among his Larro birds and would in all probability
have had about the same amount of losses in the Mintrate
birds had it not been for the fact that he changed feeds,
plaintiff, in fairness to the defendant, did not include
them in his claim for damages. Normal loss factors, such
as the outbreak of Newcastle disease which struck both flocks
in November (R. 208), not in September or October as appellant states, have thus been automatically excluded from consideration in the computation of plaintiff's damages. The New-
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castle disease caused the Larro, as well as the l\1intrate birds
to go off production for several weeks so that consequently
hardly any egg losses were included for the Mintrate birds
during that period. The egg charts which were introduced
in evidence substantiate these facts. (See R. 208) .
Plaintiff made several diffetent counts of his birds,
on both sides of the road, one in June, when the Mintrate
program was started, one in the beginning of October, and
one in the beginning of December, 1948. He had complete
figures of the number of deaths, the number of culls, and
the amount of eggs produced by the Mintrate birds as well
as the Larro birds. In his complaint, he prayed for $6,775.50
as damages on his first cause of action, $~·,522.25 as damages
on his second cause of action, and $4,978.75 on his third cause
of action. He asked for damages up to October 31, 1949
which was the end of the ·laying season of the damaged Rock.
He had found it impractical to replace part of the Mintrate
flock before, for the reason that, as will be discussed under
Point VI of this brief, piecemeal or partial replacements with
younger pullets not ready for egg production-the only chickens
then available on the market-would have upset the annual
cycle of his poultry business. The Court, however, did not
permit him to prove any losses ·beyond December 9, 1948
(R. 538) . As a result, and as a result of the many deductions
from his proved losses which plaintiff was required to make
(see Exhibit V, and R. 859), the maximum recovery allowed
was reduced to $2,231.34 which the jury returned as the total
amount of its verdict.

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGU11ENT
POINT NO. I
THE CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE
JURY UPON )'HE THEORY OF EXPRESS WARRANTY.

A. There was an affirmation of fact constituting an express
warranty.
The Court instructed the jury that if the defendant had
stated that J\iintrate on the self-feed plan had been tried
numerous times, and that chickens fed Mintrate on that plan
had had no less than 65<fo production of eggs, they might find
that to constitute a warranty. (Instructions No. 9 and 13).
The record shows that the percentage of production is
a very important, if not the most important, figure in the
business of a poultry man depending for his livelihood upon
the production of his hens. Plaintiff appeared to be everconscious of that percentage and seemed to have it figured
out every day upon every gathering of the eggs. When Mr.
l\1ittelberg went to see him on July 19, plaintiff told him that
the Mintrate birds on that day were up to 631h<yo, and that
the other chickens were 1 <fo below that. A few days later
he found that the percentage of lay had gone down on the
Mintrate side. Later, plaintiff states that the Larro chickens
achieved 85<f0 and held that high figure for some time. Mr.
\Vood of General Mills also testified in terms of percentages
of egg production. The 65% statement therefore had a very
definite, all-important, mathematically ascertainable meaning
which left no doubt as to its significance in the mind of any
egg producer. It can therefore· not be regarded in one class
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with such statements as that a car will last 50 years or that
cars of that type had lasted 50 years, or that a certain product
will give soro more satisfaction.
\Vhile the Court limited the jury to this one statement,
it must of course be considered in the setting of all the related claims for the new free choice feed that were made,
and the situation plaintiff found himself in when pressed to
purchase an unknown product. Particular attention is called
to the pamphlet Barron showed the plaintiff prior to the sale
(Exhibit A) wherein it is stated that the Mintrate self-feed
way of feeding chickens "has been successfully used by thousands of Moorman customers."
It is submitted that the representation with respect to
tl1e 65)0 egg yield, taken alone as well as in its context amounts
to an express warranty, and the jury was justified to so find.
In Studeba.~er Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, 50 Utah
319, 167 Pac. 663 (1917), the Court held a statement by the
sell~r that a car is "as good as new and ... fit for the use
of the carrying of passengers to and from the New Grand
Hotel ... " to be not merely an opinion of the salesman but
an express warranty. The Court stated:
"We think from the foregoing statements made concerning the particular car in question something more
was to be implied, as a matter of law, than that the
plaintiff could sell the defendants a junk pile for an
automobile and then escape liability therefor by saying
such statements were only 'seller's talk.' "
Again, in Sumrners v. Provo Foundry & Machine Co., 53
Utah 320, 178 Pac. 916 (1919), the Supreme Court of Utah
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held in an action for the breach of warranty in the sale of a
Hudson car that
"there was a warranty as to the car being free from
defects as to material and workmanship, but we regard the statement that the car would do whatever
any other Super-Six would do as also amounting to
an express warranty, and not mere 'seller's talk,' or an
expression of opinion."
In Jorgensen v. Gessell Brick Co., 45 Utah 31, 141 Pac.
460 ( 1914) the Court held a representation that brick is "first
class-wire-cut, white brick" to be an express warranty of the
quality and color of the brick.
And in Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah 180, 166 Pac.
( 2d) 536 ( 1946), it was held that the question as to whether
statements were made regarding the kind of wheat sold which
might have induced the plaintiff to buy it, should have been
put to the jury to find whether they constituted an express
warranty. The court said that
"where it appears doubtful whether or not the statement is one of fact or opinion and therefore whether
there is a warranty, the question should be left to the
trier of the facts.''
See also Stringfellow v. Botterill Auto Co., 63 Utah 56,
221 Pac. 861, ;4 A.L.R. 533, holding a statement that a
car is a 1922 model to be a warranty, and Beaver Drug Co.
v. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 Pac. 695 ( 1923) which held that
a representation that certain stock would inventory $4,000
was not an expression of opinion.
26
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In contrast to the facts of these cases, Detroit Vapor
Stoz,.e Co. z·. W eeter Lumbet· Co., ( 1923) 61 Utah 503, 2! 5
Pac. 995 relied on by appellant presents a typical case of "puffing" or "dealer's talk." All that was said to the buyer of
certain stoves was that the buyer would have no difficulty in
reselling them to his customers, that they would "sell like
hot cakes."
The Court stated:
"For a dealer to say that the article he offers for sale
'will sell like hot cakes' may have a tendency to induce
an ardent lover of hot cakes to make an improvident
purchase, but it affords him no grounds of action or
defense if the statement proves to be false."
No case has been found in Utah or any other jurisdiction
relating to express warranties made in the sale of feed for
chickens. However, there is one Utah case where an implied
warranty of fitness for the particular purpose was held .to be
present where wheat sold for the purpose of being fed to
chickens was found unfit and caused damage to the buyer's
flock. Thatcher Milling and Elevator Co. v. Campbell, 64
Utah 422, 231 Pac. 621 ( 1924).
The case most closely related on its facts to the case at
bar that has been found is Miller v. Economy Hog & Cattle
Powder Co., 228 Iowa 626, 293 N.W. 4 (1940). There the
owner of sheep sued the manufacturer of a livestock powder
in an action for breach of express warranty and negligence
for losses of sheep caused through the feeding of defendant's
powder. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that a statement
by defendant's agent that it would be all right to feed the
27
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powder to plaintiff's sheep in the condition they were in was
prDper!y submitted to the jury upon the theory of express
warranty. The Court distinguishes De Zeeuw v. Fox Chemical
Company, 189 Iowa 1195, 179 N.W. 605 (1920) (the main
authority relied upon by appellant for Point I and Point III
of its brief) decided 20 years earlier by the Supreme Court
of Iowa, as follows:
"Appellant contends this statement was merely an
expression of opinion and not a warranty, and relies
upon De Zeeuw v. Fox Chemical Company, 189 Iowa
1195, 179 N.W. 605. In that case the statement pleaded
as a warranty was that a worm powder would improve
the growth and physical condition of certain hogs, the
claimed breach being that the powder contained poison.
The court held the statement was not a warranty but
merely an expression of opinion similar to that of
a physican that a certain prescription would benefit
an ill person. It was also held that the alleged poison
in the powder was not a breach of the particular warranty pleaded in that case.
"The evidence of warranty in the case at bar was
not a promise to improve the growth or effect a cure
but that it would be all right to feed the stock powder
to the sheep, in other words that the powder could not
harm the sheep."
Later in its opinion, the Court in the Millet' case· again
refers to "the erroneous premise that- this was a warranty of
cure." The Court also held that the question of implied
warranty of fitness was properly left to the jury although the
powder had a trade name.
The distinction made by the court between a ''warranty
of cure" and a normal warranty of good quality and fitness is
28
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the basis for a line of decisions which hold that physicians
and surgeons do not, in the absence of special contract, guarantee the success of their treatment (see 27 A.L.R. 1250),
and that the manufacturer of vaccines or serums for the innoculation of anir11als against some specific disease is not generally
a warrantor of the efficacy of the remedy. (See 39 A.L.R.
399).
The case of De Zeettw v. Fox Chemical Company falls
into this group of authorities relating to medicines and cures
which have no application to the case at bar. In the case of
food, as distinguished from medicines, the trend of the authorities is in the opposite direction, and according to some
authorities the principle that there is an implied warranty of
soundness in the sale of provisions has been extended to the
sale of feed for animals. See 22 Am. Jur. Food, sec. 121,

p. 904.
In Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co. v. Compton, 132
N.E. 642 ( 1921) an Indiana Court held statements in pamphlets and made by defendant's agent that the stock powder
manufactured by it was "a beneficial and valuable food for
brood sows" to be "more than mere expressions of opinion or
dealer's talk. They were representations of fact.
In Swift and Co. v. Redhead, 147 Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140,
( 1909) the agent of a feed company recommended blood
meal as a cattle feed, stating that it was very fine feed for
cattle, that many were using it, that it is valuable in preventing
scours in calves, that it was better than cotton seed meal, and
it would cause cattle to take on fat much quicker. The Court
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held that this was sufficient to sustain a verdict finding that
this was a warranty.
See also A1oorman Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 209 Ill.
App. 104 (1918) which states in the abstract reported:
"Evidence was held sufficient to warrant a finding
that a certain hog remedy sold by plaintiff to defendant
was sold upon certain representations as to its effects
upon hogs and that it did not have such effect upon defendant's hogs."
Judgment was given to defendant in the action which
was for the price of the product sold.
See also United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco,
130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W. (2d) 432 (1937) holding general
statements of a pipe manufacturer that the pipe was amply
strong for use under deep fills, that it would stand the load
and had stood heavy fills at other places to amount to express
warranties. The Court stated:
"It is vigorously denied that any warranty was given
for the reason that the statements relied on to show
warranty were at most but expressions of an opinion or
judgment only.

"To properly appraise this contention, it is necessary
to here briefly sketch the background of such statements. Hi-tensile pipe was a recent invention and had
been little used. The parties were not dealing with
each other at arm's length, and with reference to an
article as well known to one as the other. The manufacturer ltad decidedly superior advantage in its knowledge of the fitness of this pipe for the use intended,
and of its quality. Presumably, as its largest manufacturer and its enthusiastic sponsor, it knew or should
30
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have known, better than the city of Waco could know,

of its fitness and quality."
The Court then held that the above statements, "considered
in their proper settings, and not as isolated statements" amounted to an express warranty, quoting from another case that
"Superior knowledge of the seller, in conjunction
with the buyer's relative ignorance, operates to make
the slightest divergence from· mere praise into representations of fact effective as a warranty.''
And see Tomlinson Co. v. Mo1'gan, ____ N.C. ____ , 82 S.E. 95 3,
( 1914) where it was held tha~ a representation that fertilizer
is "a high-grade fertilizer, specially suited for tobacco" justified the jury to find an express warranty, not a mere opinion;
Reiger t'. Worth, (1902), 130 -N.C. 268, 41 S.E. 277, holding
"excellent seed rice" to amount to a warranty; Ingraham v.
Associated Oil Co., 166 Wash. 205, 6 Pac. ( 2d) 645 ( 193·2)
where the jury was held justified in finding an express warranty where fruit grower was told that a spray would not harm
trees but kill a pest; Reese v. Bates, 94 Va. 321, 26 S.E. 865,
( 1897) to the effect that a sale of guano as "good fertilizer,
and as well adapted to the raising of potatoes as any other
in the market" was made with an express warranty; and
Swift Co. v. Meekins, 179 N.C. 173, 102 S.E. 138 (1920),
where the court held that a statement by the seller's agent that
fertilizer "was as good fertilizer as there was on the market,
as good as any sold to be used for cotton and- corn" constituted an express warranty as a matter of law, and that the
question of warranty should not have been left to the jury,
remanding the case for a new trial.
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For a long list of cases in which statements were held to
be warranties, rather than "puffing" or mere opinions, see
Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 203, footnote 16,
first part, preceding the list incorporated by appellant into
pp. 18-20 of its brief.
There is no question that Barron told Park that chickens
on the Mintrate plan had not laid under 65<jo. See the testimony of Barron quoted by appellant on p. 14 of its brief
(R. 408-409). Barron says he told that to Park, and then he
goes on to say by way of excuse to the examing counsel-not to Park-that he made that statement on the basis of
what he had heard. Of course, as an agent employed to make
sales, Barron could not be expected to have any personal
knowledge of experiments with the feed. The only question
relevant under this Point is whether the statement was actually
made by him, not from where he obtained his information.
At the time of the sale to plaintiff, Barron was convinced
that he was giving true facts to his customers; as soon as
some doubts as to the correctness of the representations entered
his mind, he stopped making representations and soon thereafter left the employ of the company (R. 448-449).
It is true that in addition to the statements as to the past
experience with Mintrate, some representations were made
that chickens on the Mintrate plan would produce no less
than 65<j0 . While the court limited the jury to a finding as
to past results obtained, it would have been perfectly proper
to submit also those statements relating to future results to
be expected. See Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed., Vol. i:
32
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"Sec. 212.

H7 arr.utty of future et ents.
1

It is said by Blackstone: 'The warranty can only
reach the things in being at the time of the warranty
made, and not the things in future; as that a horse
is sound at the buying of him, not that he will be sound
two years hence.' An understanding of Blackstone's
meaning needs a recollection that the law of warranty
originated in an action on the case for deceit. It is
of course lttW today that one may bind himself by
contract for the happening of any future event, and
a warranty of a piano for a year, for instance is a contract to be answerable for any defect that may occur
during that time; and the definition of express warrmzty in the Sales Act includes promises." (Emphasis
supplied.)

See also Sec. 194, p. 499 ibid. to the effect that in its later
development the action of assumpsit was substituted as a
remedy for breach of warranty for the earlier action based
on fraud, and that as a result many cases held that only a
promise, as distinguished from an affirmation of fact, can
constitute a warranty.

B. Park did rely on the oral representations.
While it is true that plaintiff felt that a written guaranty
would give him more protection than oral representations alone,
he placed reliance on both the oral statements and the guaranty.
He testified on cross examination:

"Q. Did you ask for the written guaranty?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why?
A. Because verbal warranties are not too good.
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Q. You had no confidence in any verbal warranty?

A. Well, I had confidence to the effect that anybody,
if they did you damage, should reimburse you
for your loss, I should imagine; but without a
statement of this sort of thing, a man has to have
a little to show-I figured.

Q. Didn't you believe Gail Barron?
A. Yes, I believed Gail Barron, as far as I am a businessman of any sort, as a friend, yes; but as a
business agreement, no.

Q. In other words, you did not rely on his reputation?
A. Yes, I relied on his reputation on account of his
pamphlets and books that showed to that effect."
R. 190).
Williston on Sales states in sec. 206:
nThere is danger of giving greater effect to the requirement of reliance than it is entitled to. Doubtless
the burden of proof is on the buyer to establish this as
one of the elements of his case. But the warranty
need not be the sole inducement to the buyer to purchase the goods;''
See also 46 Am. Jur. sec. 13, p. 495:
"One who examines an article himself and relies on
his own judgment may at the same time protect himself by taking a warranty upon which he also relies."
It is clear, therefore, that one particular warranty need
not be the sole inducement for a sale. The buyer may rely
on several different warranties or on his own judgment and
a warranty.
The whole question of reliance comes up only in cases
34
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where there is a question as to whether the buyer makes the
purchase on the strength of his own judgment or inspectiq,n,
or whether he is induced to buy by the seller's representations.
In the case at bar, there is no question that plaintiff was in
no position to form a judgment of his own on the appropriateness of defendant's feeding plan for chickens. Nothing short
of an actual test, that is, a purchase, .could satisfy him as to
that. Knowing then that he had to rely, that there was no
other alternative, he did what any cautious and prudent man
would have done under the circumstances: he asked for as
many assurances as he could possibly get. First, he listened
to the oral representations, then he read the pamphlets and
other literature, and finally he obtained the written agreement.
As he states in the above testimony, he did have confidence
in' the verbal warranty, he did have confidence in the salesman ·
and especially the printed material he showed him, and he
did believe that that would give him some protection in the
event of any loss, but in addition he felt he should also have
"a little to show." It is submitted that Barron relied on
the oral representations as much as on the guaranty.
In this connection, attention is called to Instruction No.
12 which instructed the jury fully upon the subject of reliance,
and to the fact that plaintiff gave his first order for feed before
the written guaranty was discussed; that at that time he agreed
to put only 1,250 chickens on the Mintrate feed; that later
he raised that figure to 2,850 chickens and actually fed them
Mintrate beginning about June 11 while the guaranty was
not signed before June 19. (See the Statement of Facts above).
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C. All the necessarr elements of an express warranty are

present.
No statement has been found in Williston on Sales, either
in section 211 or on page 548 as claimed by appellant (on p.
26 of its brief) to the effect that when recovery is on a warranty as a statement of fact, the statement must be proved
to be untrue. Nor does the quotation from Blackstone have
such a meaning. (See Williston sec. 212 quoted above
under A).
Under the Uniform Sales Act the only elements of an express warranty are ( 1) an affirmation of fact (or promise) ;
( 2) reliance by the purchaser, and ( 3) a sale.
Appellant evidently means to say that there should be
proof of the breach of the warranty. Respondent submits that
the point of breach of the warranty is covered by Point No.
IV of appellant's brief relating to proximate cause. If plaintiff
establishes that his loss was proximately caused by defendant's
feed, it is submitted that no further proof is required to show
that the representation is false. See 46 Am. Jur. sec. 736:
"It is usual to allege that the defendant falsely and
fraudulently warranted, etc., but the words 'falsely and
fraudulently' are considered as only matters of form."
It must be stated, however, that there is clear evidence
in the record to show that the statement as to 65Cfo production
was absolutely false. Dr. Elmslie, Director of Research, and
Mr. Mittelberg, superintendent of- the Experimental Farm
of defendant, both testified that no experiments to speak of,
and in any event no experiment resulting in 65Cfo egg pro36
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duction of chickens was conducted on the company farm
before the release of ~Iintrate 40 to the public -in the fall
of 1947. Also, none of these company officials knew of any experiment in the field supervised by defendant where any production figures "''ere available or showed 657o egg yield
6~·5,

(R. 634-

825). The representations made were not only untrue, but

there is eYidence that defendant knew them to be untrue or,
without actually knowing their falsity, made them recklessly,
without regard to their truth or falsity which would have
made out a case of fraud.
See Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co. v. Compton,
Ind., ____ , 132 N.E. 642 ( 1921) holding a stock powder
company liable for fraudulent representations that a certain
powder would keep livestock in a healthy condition.
That defendant produced two witnesses who testifiedwithout any clear production figures-that they had had satisfactory results with ~Iintrate over one year after this action

was started, o£ course, does not prove that there was any testing
of the product before its release on the market. There was also
no indication, in the period after the Mintrate was put out,
in the fall of 1947 and before plaintiff was contacted in June,
1948, that defendant made any tests or experiments which
would justify the claims made for the feed and the self-feed
method.

POINT NO. II
THE ISSUE OF THE AUTHORITY OF BARRON TO
MAKE AN ORAL WARRANTY WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
37
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According to Instruction No. 2 plaintiff was not allowed
to recover under the terms of the written agreement (Exhibit
(C) because the Court found there was insufficient proof of
the comparative feed costs as required under paragraph 1
of ·the agreement (R. 705). The denial of recovery was not ·
predicated upon any ruling with respect to Barron's authority
to execute the written guaranty.
While plaintiff is of the opinion that under the evidence
Barron had authority to execute the written guaranty, that
question is not here presented. The only question is whether
Barron had authority to make the oral representations relied
upon by the plaintiff.
In this connection, it is submitted that evidence establishing ·Barron's authority to give a written guaranty tends to prove
that he also had power to make oral representations along
the same general lines as the guaranty, upon the theory
that the larger power includes the lesser. The reverse, however, would not appear to be true. That is to say, if it is found,
particularly under the theory of implied warranty, that Barron
lacked authority to enter into a written contract guaranteeing
definite results, it does not follow therefrom, as appellant contends on p. 39 of its brief, that Bar~on did not have implied
power to make oral representations within the scope of his
authority as a sales agent.

A. There was sufficient evidence to find that Bar1'on had
express or implied authority to make oral representations.
1. Express Authority. As has been related in the Statement
of Facts above, Barron did not execute the guaranty agreement
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before asking his superior, the District Sales Manager of Utah,
Mr. J\lcArthur, for authority to execute it. Mr. McArthur
replied that he would first have to obtain the approval of
his superior, Mr. McCullough, the State Sales Manager of
the defendant for Utah, Idaho, and parts of Nevada. McArthur called him on the telephone at his home in Idaho and
was told by McCullough that "by all means you could guarantee it under those circumstances to anyone," and that the
company "would equal the production of any competitive feed."
(R. 286, 300). Thereupon McArthur told Barron-and Mr.
Park-that McCullough had authorized the giving of a
guaranty to Park.
McCullough, who was sick in bed when· his deposition was taken, denied that he had given such authority (R. 849). However, since he denied having knowledge of just about every occurrence at sales meetings and
elsewhere which were testified to by other witnesses, his testimony was evidently not given much weight by the jury. Also,
there was evidence of rifts within the company, of disagreements between Mittelberg and McCullough with respect to
the claims that had been made for the self-feed method, a
definite reversal of McCullough by Mittelberg on the point
that chickens on their feed would not moult, which occurred
at the sales meeting of July 19 (R. 419-420, 447-448), and
finally McCullough was, after the events at Park's place, at
least temporarily released from his position in the defendant
company (R. 851-852). This may have been an additional
reason for his disclaiming any knowledge of the guaranty.
The telephone company testified for defendant that there had
39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

According to Instruction No. 2 plaintiff was not allowed
to recover under the terms of the written agreement (Exhibit
(C) because the Court found there was insufficient proof of
the comparative feed costs as required under paragraph 1
of- the agreement ( R. 705). The denial of recovery was not predicated upon any ruling with respect to Barron's authority
to execute the written guaranty.
While plaintiff is of the opinion that under the evidence
Barron had authority to execute the written guaranty, that
question is not here presented. The only question is whether
Barron had authority to make the oral representations relied
upon by the plaintiff.
In this connection, it is submitted that evidence establishing Barron's authority to give a written guaranty tends to prove
that he also had power to make oral representations alongthe same general lines as the guaranty, upon the theory
that the larger power includes the lesser. The reverse, however, would not appear to be true. That is to say, if it is found,
particularly under the theory of implied warranty, that Barron
lacked authority to enter into a written contract guaranteeing
definite results, it does not follow therefrom, as appellant contends on p. 39 of its brief, that Barron did not have implied
power to make oral representations within the scope of his
authority as a sales agent.

A. There was sufficient evidence to find that Bar1'on had
express or implied authority to make oral representations.
1. Express Authority. As has been related in the Statement
of Facts above, Barron did not execute the guaranty agreement

38

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

before asking his superior, the District Sales Manager of Utah,
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the claims that had been made for the self-feed method, a
definite reversal of McCullough by Mittelberg on the point
that chickens on their feed would not moult, which occurred
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reason for his disclaiming any knowledge of the guaranty.
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been no call between McArthur and McCullough at the time
in question, but stated that its records covered collect calls
only, and that there had been some telephone conversations
between McArthur and McCullough later in June, 1948
(R. 746-747).
This was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that McCullough had expressly authorized Barron through McArthur
to give the guaranty.
Appellant insists, however, that any authority to guarantee
had to come all the way from the head office of the company
in Quincey, Illinois. This, it is submitted, is not a correct
view of the law. The evidence is clear that McCullough was
not a special agent, but a general agent of the company with
power to recruit salesmen, to hold training programs and instruct salesmen as to the quality of the feed and the self-feed
method, and in general to do anything necessary and proper
to advance the business of the company in the territory assigned to him. He had no special instructions from the company, as Mr. Holmes testified, "other than would be considered
in the normal trend of business" (R. 615-616). Particularly
did he have no special instructions with respect to the giving
or authorizing of guarantees or warranties. If there was
actually a policy of the company which did not permit guarantees or warranties, it was never brought to the attention of its
sales managers or agents. As Mittelberg testified, the sale;,
instructions were silent in this respect and contained neither
a permission nor a prohibition (R. 803). At the time in
question the company was particularly interested in extending
its sales to the State of Utah. McArthur testified in this respect:
40
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"This chicken business-at the itme I was made manager, we had very little business in the chicken feeding,
and l\1r. Tolley, who preceded me, had tried several
times to get into the Salt Lake area and the Utah
County area where -there were a lot of chickens, and
had not been very s'licq~ssful; and l\1r. McCullough,
after I was made district ,manager, continually impressed me with the fact that we had to get in and
get some of this business down here. It was a milliondollar busines, and it was going by" (R. 291-292).
It is submitted that l\1cCullough within the scope of his

powers as general sales manager had authority to authorize
guaranties which he found helpful in the drive to introduce
defendant's feed into this area; and that he had good reason
to assume that obtaining a customer with as large a flock as
Park's, by means of a written guaranty if need be, would be
most beneficial for these purposes.
If the written guaranty was thus found to be expressly
authorized under the evidence, it is submitted that power to
make an oral warranty along the same lines can be inferred therefrom, as has been pointed out before. While
the writing guarantees the production of ··an equal amount
of eggs" by the l\1intrate birds as is produced by Park's other
birds, from the practical standpoint of a poultry man the
657o production figure means just about the same. To him
a 657o y,ield signifies nothing more than good or adequate
production, approximately the same level of production that
he knew from experience that he had achieved before. (The
evidence discloses that the Larro birds had an 857o egg yield
for a good part of the period in question) . It was not so
much the 65fo figure, which only assured him of adequate
41
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,
results, but its combination with the more simple and more
economical feeding method which finally persuaded Park
to make the purchase.
2. Implied authority. (a) The most obvious source of Barron's

authority to make the oral warranty is found in the instructions
he received by McCullough and McArthur during the salesmen's training meetings and from McCullough personally.
McCullough's authority to give instructions is admitted by
1\fr. Mittelberg in his testimony (R. 803, 811-812). The
testimonies of Barron and McArthur are positive to the effect
that the salesmen were told that the feed had been tried
numerous times and that there had always been a minimum
of 657o egg yield when the hens were fed Mintrate in the
s~lf-feed manner (R. 398-402, 282-285). There was evidence that this statement, together with the other representations described. in the Statement of Facts above, were intended
to be repeated to prospective customers. As a matter of fact,
McArthur accompanied Barron on his first sales trips and
Barron heard him make the statement as to 657o minimum
egg lay to a prospective customer (R. 406-407). This was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find, in accordance with
Instruction No. 11, together with Instruction No. 15 (I-C),
that Barron had authority to make the representations he made
to Park.
It is submitted that Instruction No. 11, which is criticized
by appellant on p. 44 of its brief because it uses the term
"estoppel," correctly states the law which the jury was charged
to apply, and that it is immaterial whether the particular type
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of authority referred to was labelled implied authority, apparent authority, or authority by estoppel.
In his connection, the attention of the Court is invited
to the following statement pr l\1echem on Agency, 2nd Ed.,
Vol. 1, sec. 723, p. 512:
"There is, in many places, a tendency to include
under the one head of 'apparent powers' those deduced from usage or from the character in which the
agent is authorized to act, and also those resulting from
estoppel. In very many cases it is entirely immaterial
practically, because there is enough in the proof to
satisfy the requirements of either rule; and in many
cases also usage and estoppel may unite to account
for the powers exercised."
See also the diagram on p. 515 of the same work where
apparent authority is listed as being based on the theory of
estoppel.
(b) Furthermore, it is submitted that Barron had implied
power within the scope of his authority as a sales agent, to
make the oral representations relied upon by Park, particularly in view of the fact that he was introducing a new feed
and a new feeding method into a new territory and that his
prospective customers had no means of ascertaining the quality
and appropriateness of the feed and of the method for themselves.
The Restatement of the Law of Agency, sec. 63, states
the rule as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed, authority to -sell includes
authority to make such, and only such, representations
43
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as the agent reasonably believes to ~e true and as a~e
usual with reference to such a subJect matter or, m
the absence of usctge, representations concerning qualities of the subject matter which, at the time, are not
open to inspection and as to which the principal has
reason to know the buyer will desire to be informed."
(Emphasis supplied.)
And J\.1echem on Agency, cited above, states in sec. 881,
p. 631 that there may be cases
''in which the making of a warranty of quality is so
practically essential to the making of the sale as, without proof of usage, to justify the inference of the power
as a necessary incident of the authority to sell. A number of cases have been put upon this ground. Thus,
an agent for a distant principal, endeavoring to introduce a new article in a certain community, and who
could not sell it unless it was warranted, has been held
to have authority to warrant as a necessary incident
to the authority to sell." (Emphasis supplied).
See also sec. 890, p. 636 of the same work:
"Thus, if the principal should send an agent out to
introduce and sell a new article, as, for example, a new
machine, a new article of food, a new medicine, and
the like, authority to answer questions or to make
statements, concerning such matters as would naturally
and ordinarily arise under such circumstances, would
properly be implied. Questions respecting the purpose
of the article, the manner in which it might be safely
handled, the conditions and circumstances under which
it could be properly used, and the like, would fall within
this prinCiple."
In International Harvester Co. v. Lawyer, ____ Okla. ____ ,
155 Pac. 617 (1916) it was held that an agent with power to
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sell an automobile in a new territory had implied authority
to warrant that it would go over the particular roads and
could go anywhere a team of mules could be driven (which
was held an express warranty rather than a statement of
opinion). The Court stated:
"In the case at bar, the defendant was seeking to
introduce an automobile, untried and unproven in that
particular section, and it seems most reasonable to
presume that an agent, endeavoring to obtain some
one ~ho would stand sponsor for it there, owing to
a general custom, had the implied power to warrant
the same. If the reputation of the automobile in that
vicinity had been so well established that it had become a staple, then this rule might not apply, but
we believe it does apply most certainly when an untried
article is sought to be introduced in a new field."
See also Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App,
246, 130 S.W. 430 (1910) where the court held the defendant
· company bound by the representations made by its agent in
connection with the sale of a ginger extract, stating:
"The defendant permitted the agent to go into the
field and solicit orders. In soliciting business for the
defendant, questions would naturally come up concerning the quality and usefulness of the articles the
agent was attempting to sell, and therefore statements
made by the agent concerning the quality of the articles
and the purposes for which they were intended must
be within his apparent authority."
Cf. Smith Table Co. v. Madsen, 84 Pac. 885, 30 Utah 297
( 1906) to the effect that a certain traveling salesman had
power, within the apparent scope of his authority, to give a
trade discount, and Smith v. Droubay, 20 Utah 44~· ( 1899)
45
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holding that a sales agent with power to make a contract also
had power, as an incident to his employment, to fix the time
for the delivery of the goods.
The case at. bar falls directly under the principles of the
above authorities. Neither Barron nor any other salesman
could have sold a single bag of Mintrate in this state, had it
not been for the representations made as to 65lfo egg yield
together with the promise of a more simple and more economical feeding method. Thus, whether McCullough or anyone else
in the company expressly or by implication authorized Barron to
make an oral warranty, his power to warrant must be implied
as a necessary incident to his authority to sell under the peculiar
circumstances of the case. Under the above authorities no
particular proof of custom to warrant is required under such
circumstances.
The authorities relied upon by appellant on pages 28-38
of its brief are not inconsistent with this position. They
are based on the principle that a salesman has no implied
power to do anything that is unusual or extraordinary. As compared with the facts of these cases, there is nothing unusual
in giving an oral warranty in the case at bar. There is no
question, as these authorities hold, that a salesman has no
implied power to take back merchandise, to modify the terms
of a contract after it is complete, ~o sell for a lower price
than instructed, or to warrant liquor against seizure under
the revenue laws. All these powers are truly "unusual"
or extraordinary. However, as is stated in Friedman & Sons
v. Kelly, 126 Mo. App. 2]9, 102 S. W. 1066, quoted at
length by appellant on p. 34 of its brief, while a traveling
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salesman does not have authority to warrant whiskey against
seizure under the revenue laws, he does have implied power
to make warranties which are not unusual such as a warranty
of the quality and condition ot the whiskey sold.
,

The case of Roy. tl Seed ami L1lilling Co. l'. Thorne, 142
lvliss. 92 ( 1926), cited by appellant on p. 38 of its brief, does
not relate to the implied authority of an agent, however. It
holds that there was no implied warranty of fitness, and that
the plaintiff who \Yas the customer of the dealer could not
recover against the manufacturer on the ground of breach of
warranty.
It is conceivable, as appellant contends, that the making of a u•1·itten gttarantee binding a feed company to reimburse a customer in a certain amount would be held unusual,
and not within the implied powers of a sales agent. But that
is not true for oral representations without the help of which
a sale in a new territory could not be expected by the company
to be consummated. Also, defendant does not poip.t. to any
significant evidence to the effect that oral warranties by feed
companies are unusual. The plaintiff said he thought it was
unusual for a feed company to give a written guarantee (R.
191), that he personally had not received an oral guarantee
(R. 191); Mr. Wood of General Mills stated that he had not
seen a written guarantee of the type Barron received before
(R. 385); and Mr. Holmes, a director of the defendant company said that his company had not given express authority
to make written or oral guarantees· and had a policy against
permitting them. Mr. Mittelberg testified, however, that
nothing was said to the agents and employees of the company
47
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about guarantees, that there was just no general permission
given to execute guarantees (R. 803). See Mechem, sec.
887, p. 635 where the author states that
"evidence is not admissible to prove that it was not
the custom of this particular principal to warrant, unless it be shown that the purchaser had notice of that
fact, or that the agent was expressly forbidden to
warrant, unless notice of such prohibition be brouaht
b
"
home to t11e pureh aser.
.
For cases in which feed companies, including the defendant company itself, have been found to have made a warranty,
through the medium of an agent, see for example l\1iller v.
Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co,, 228 Iowa 626, 293
N. \VI. 4 ( 1940) holding that a warranty by an agent that
the stock powder in question was harmless for sheep was
not an unusual warranty; Economy Hog and Cattle Powder
Co. v. Compton, ____ Ind. ____ , 132 N.E. 642 ( 1921); Crouch

v. National Liz)estock Remedy Co., 205 Iowa 51, 217 N. W.
55 7 ( 19i8) where the authority of the agent to make a warranty was not questioned; and Swift & Co. v. Redhead, 147
Iowa 94, 122 N. W. 140 (1909) where the authority of an
agent to warrant the quality of feed for cattle was also assumed
to be present.
And in A1oorman Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 280
Ky. 845, 134 S. W. (2nd) 936 (1939), the court held in an
action for damages resulting from the feeding of defendant's
mineral to dairy cows that defendant's agents acted within
the scope of their authority in selling the feed when making
representations with respect to the product. (The language
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of the court is not quite clear on this point, but this is evidently
what it meant to say) .

B. There 'Was e11idence that Barron had authority ttnder the
theory of ratification.
Under the rules as stated in the Restatement of the Law
of Agency, sec. 82, et seq., ratification is basically an "affirmance" of a previous unauthorized act by the principal or his
authorized agent. Affirmance may be inferred from any
conduct manifesting consent, from failure to repudiate transactions, or from the receipt or retention of benefits. It is not
necesary that there be a receipt of benefits or their retention,
if affirmance can be inferred from words or conduct of the
principal or his authorized agent.
In the case at bar there is one incident that may be found
to establish Barron's authority by operation of the doctrine
of ratification.
On July 19, 1948, after plaintiff had been using defendant's feed for about a month, and had started to notice a loss
of weight among the Mintrate birds, Mr. Mittelberg came out
to see him. Mr. Barron testified as follows:
"He was worried about the loss of weight, and he
wanted someone to look at them. He wanted
some man, in our company if possible, to see them.

"Q. Did you get some man in your company to look
at them?
A. On the 19th of July Mr. Mittelberg of our company went to Park's place and looked at them.

Q. Were you with him?
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A. Yes.
THE WITNESSS: May I qualify one answer?

Q. Yes.
A. That there was a meeting held at the Hotel Utah,
as I remember it, it was on July 19. It was that
day that Mr. Mittelberg went to Park's place.

Q. Did you tell Mr. Mittelberg about the loss of
weight of Park's birds?
A. Yes.

Q. What did :Mr. Mittelberg say about the birds?
A. He asked Park if he had tried different methods, if
he had mixed his wheat with his oats. As I remember it, he said specifically, in some instances,
that where it is, they eat more, and he asked about
such general questions of Mr. Park" (R. 418-419).
On the same day the meeting of salesmen and Mr. Mittelberg and Mr. McCullough took place which has already been
referred to, Mr. Mittleberg discussed the self-feed method in
· great detail and reversed McCullough on the point that chickens
on their method would not moult, also cautioned the salesmen
about the self-feed method in general and discouraged them
from "selling a method" (R. 419-420).

It must be assumed that Mr. Mittleberg knew when he
went to see Mr. Park on the same day what representations the
salesmen had been instructed to make, and that Barron presumably had made those representations to Park when he
first sold him the feed. If he did not know about the guaranty,
he knew or must have known about the oral representations.
50
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Knowing these he went out and advised Park on how to improve the weight of his chickens. That showed, if not more,
at least silent acquiescence, and consequently ratification of
the oral warranties made. Later, when Mr. Mittelberg went
to see Mr. Park about the guaranty, in the end of August, he
did not disclaim all liability, only stated, according to Mittelberg's own testimony, that no setttlement would be made
"on the basis of that contract" (R. 800). He did not say, as
appellant intimates on p. 42 of its brief that Barron had no
authority to make oral representations.
Iri connection with the theory of ratification, attention is
called to Mechem on Agency, above cited, sec. 396, p. 289:
"It is not to be denied that there may occasionally
be found cases in which it seems to be asserted that
there may be ratification without knowledge. Most
of these cases when examined seem to be sound enough
upon their facts, ... and what is said as to ratification
in many of them is probably merely an inadvertent
expression. Part of them belong to a class of cases . . .
which do not depend upon ratification at all. These
are cases in which an agent while doing an authorized
act has done some incidental act, given some promise,
or made some representation which was not expressly
authorized, but which is binding upon the principal
under the ordinary rules of agency . . . Although
ratification need not be resorted to at all in. these
cases, . . . it is said that the principal is liable~ if he
takes the benefits of the performance, even although
he did not know of these incidental acts. The conclusion would ordinarily have been the same, if the
doctrine of ratification had not been referred to."
Instruction No. 10 does not use the term "ratification'' at
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all. While there is the above evidence of ratification in the
record, the instruction may very well be read, in the light
of the above quotation from Mechem, as a charge with respect to implied or apparent authority rather than ratification.
In this connection compare the language used in Smith v.
Droubay, 20 Utah 443 (1899) where the opinion at pages
450 and 451, speaks in terms of "acceptance of benefits by
the principal" when holding that the agent had implied or
apparent authority as an incident of his employment.

C. There was sufficient evidence to submit the case to

the jury on the theory of estoppel.
As has been pointed out above under the discussion of
implied authority, Instruction No. 11 was properly submitted
to the jury permitting it to find that Barron's authority to
make oral representations may be derived from the instructions
he received at sales staff meetings. While the use of the
term "estoppel" may have been a misnomer, it is submitted
that the use of technical expressions like "estoppel" is not
conclusive as long as the main principles of the law of agency
are correctly stated to the jury. That there is a certain amount
of confusion surrounding the concept of estoppel, and that
the borderlines between ratification, estoppel, and apparent
authority are somewhat cloudy, is evidenced by the above
quotations from Mechem on Agency, to which the following
excerpt may be added:
Sec. 456, p.

~;36:

"In a large number of cases, if not in a majority
of them, there are present some elements of estoppel,
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as well as circumstances from which pure inferences
of approval in fact may be drawn; and any conclusion
will be likely to be one in which both elements are
more or less inseparably mixed. Courts and writerssometimes carelessly, sometimes unavoidably-pass in
apparent unconsciousness from one field to the other.
It is perhaps true, also, that our whole process of drawing inferences of fact springs from the same roots
as that from which estoppel springs. At any rate,
it is entirely clear that, in the various rules and statements of principle made respecting this matter of ratification by acquiescence, the element of estoppel is
constantly found and that it plays a large part in the
actual determination of the case."
This discussion shows that the concept of estoppel is a
very wide one, and as has been stated before, Professor Mechem
bases the whole theory of "apparent authority" on the idea
of "holding out" or "estoppel." But regardless of whether
estoppel is used in a wide or a narrow sense, appellant's
theory that estoppel applies only to the one situation where
someone has been held out as an agent and is then discharged
without notice to persons dealing with him, is based on an
entirely too restrictive use of the term.
It is submitted that there is one situation that arose under
the facts in the case at bar which gave rise to the operation
of the true theory of estoppel:
Assuming that McCullough did not approve the written
guarantee, the facts are undisputed that lvicArthur came to
plaintiff's place and assured him that the Sales Manager
had authorized it. Mr. Park did not rely on Barron's authority
in the first place. He made inquiries of Barron, and of Me-
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Arthur, who was the only superior officer of the company
with whom he had any contact. McArthur told Park personally and definitely that the company had approved the
guaranty. What more should Park have done? Telephone
McCullough himself, or someone in the office in Illinois?
It is true that a party dealing with an agent is bound to
ascertain, where any reasonable man would have any doubt,
what is the true scope of the authority of the agent. It is
submitted that that is exactly what plaintiff did. He did
not have to go to the principal himself to ascertain the scope
of Barron's authority. He only had to do as much as is
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

It is sub-

mitted that under the circumstances Park was justified in taking
McArthur's word for it, that the defendant through its District Sales Manager McArthur held Barron out as its agent
authorized to write the guaranty; that Park in reliance thereon
changed his position to his detriment by feeding the Mintrate
to his chickens; and that the company is therefore estopped
to deny Barron's authority.
In connection with this discussion of Barron's authority
to warrant, it might be pointed out generally ( 1) that McArthur
himself repeated the oral representations to Park, and that
as the District Sales Manager the scope of his authority is
even wider than that of Barron; (2) that as far as the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is concerned,
Barron's authority to warrant need not be proved. See Mechem,
cited above, sec. 883. See also Thatcher Milling and Elevator

Co. v. Campbell, 64 Utah 422, 231 Pac. 621 (1924) holding
the seller of chicken feed liable on the theory of an implied
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\\'aranty of fitness .for the particular purpose; and ( 3) that
as far as the representations of defendant are contained in
advertising matter such as Exhibit A herein, they may be actionable regardless of the authority of an agent.

POINT NO. III
BREACH OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY
MAY BE PREDICATED UPON MISDIRECTIONS GIVEN
BY DEFENDANT CONCERNING THE USE OF ITS FEED.
The case at bar does not relate to the dissemination of
ideas or professional advice to cure a sickness nor the recommendation of a method standing alone, as appellant contends,
but simply the sale of a feed with definite instructions by the
seller concerning its use. In a case of this kind, it is submitted
that there is not a separate sale of the feed, and another
separate transaction with respect to the method, but both the
feed and the method are united into an integrated whole so
that the instructions for its use become part of the sale of the
product itself. Defendant has expressed this idea itself in
its advertising leaflet (Exhibit A) entitled the "NEW, EASY,
NO MIX, SELF-FEED CONCENTRATE."
It is submitted that the instructions for use of a product
given by a manufacturer are nothing but representations of fact
(or promises) relating to the use that can be made of the
product and the results that can be obtained, which amount
to express warranties if they induce the sale and the buyer
relies on them.
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If, for example, a housewife buys "No-Rub Floor Wax,"
she relies on the representation that the wax can be used without the additional work of polishing, just as much as that
he wax itself is of good quality. And if it turns out to
be not "self-polishing" as expected, the manufacturer would
have no defense to an action for breach of warranty to the
effect that the wax itself was perfect, and that good results
could have been obtained by the use of an electric polisher.
It is submitted that simplicity of operation, where held
out as an inducement to a sale, is an affirmation of fact or
promise relating to the goods themselves which may give
rise to an action for breach of warranty, irrespective of the
quality of the goods themselves.

Another example may come even closer to the facts of
the present case: Another housewife buys an "Instant Dessert
-No Cooking." On the back of the box there are two sets
of directions. Method 1 describes the "no-cooking" way
of preparing the dessert. 1\1ethod 2 instructs the housewife
that she may cook it if she prefers, but the process takes longer
and is more cumbersome. She tries Method 1 and her family
gets sick. Should the manufacturer be allowed to say that
the ingredients of the dessert itself are good, that Method 1
might be harmful, but that he cannot be held responsible
for a mere method, particularly where an alternative method
was also provided for?
The same reasoning applies to an implied warranty
of fitness for the particular purpose. It is submitted that
fitness includes all appropriateness of using a product,
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and if the seller suggests a method that is harmful, that would
amount to a breach of the implied warranty.
No authorities have been found expressly discussing
this point. However, the courts seem to assume that the
suggestion of a method of use may give rise to an action for
breach of warranty.
In i1Iiller Z'. Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co., 228
Iowa 626, 293 N. W. 4 (1940), for example, the court stated:
"Veterinarians also testified the forced feeding
method of giving the powder to sheep with a mild form
of gastritis would have a bad effect and be dangerous
because some of the animals would get too much of
the mixture. This method was adopted by appellee
under instructions from Kenworthy."
The Court concluded that there was substantial evidence to
show that the death of the sheep was chargeable to the
feeding of the stock powder.
And in Aloorman Manufacturing Company v. Barker, ___ _Ind.
____ , 40 N.E. ( 2d) 348 ( 1942), an action was brought for damages resulting from the loss of a litter of pigs caused by feeding
defendant's feed. The suit was on the theory of breach of
warranty and negligence. Plaintiff's evidence disclosed that
he was instructed by defendant's agent to let the sows have
all the feed they wanted, and that they would not eat too
much of it. The Court said that there was no evidence that
the feed contained any deleterious or poisonous ingredients;
and that in the Court's judgment, the complaint is
"based upon the theory that the appellants recommended that the sows be alowed to eat all they wanted of the
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mineral· and although the appellee used due care and
precaution, the loss occur~ed ~s th~ prox~mate result
of the negligent verbal duect10ns m tellmg appellee
how to feed the product."
Judgment for plaintiff was reversed for failure of the instructions to include the element of plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence.
In this connection attention is called to Instruction
No. 3 to the effect that plaintiff has to establish that
he followed the instructions given to him by defendant.
Assuming that appellant's theory is correct, plaintiff would
be required to show (as he has done) that he complied with
defendant's directions as a prerequisite to recovery, but
defendant would then .be allowed to defend on the theory
that the loss would not have occurred if the instructions had
been disregarded. This, it is submitted, cannot be the law
of this state.

POINT NO. IV
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S
LOSS WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S
FEED AND FEEDING METHOD.
There was a great mass of highly persuasive evidence linking the Mintrate feed and self-feed plan with the deaths
among plaintiff's chickens and the decline in their egg
production. It is hard to see how under these circumstances
appellant can earnestly contend that proximate causation was
not s'ufficiently established.
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Not only was there a great volume of testimony pointing
to the feed used as the cause of plaintiffs losses, but this
evidence is practically uncontroverted by any proof defendant
had to offer.
Appellant insists at least six different times in the course
of its brief that "no veterinarian had ever examined the chickens" (p. 83, also pages 4, 6, 50, 54, 82). It fails to mention
one of its own major witnesses, Robert Allan Sturdy, Doctor
of Veterinary Medicine and Research Veterinarian of the
Moorman Manufacturing Company (R. 707). As has been
related in the Statement of Facts above, Dr. Sturdy was called
to Utah by defendant's agents in order to make a thorough
examination of plaintiffs chickens. He did so, and was quite
disturbed about what he found, remarking to the bystanders
that '\-\'e are just starving these chickens to death on all the
feed they want" (R. 290, 424, 524, 15 5). On the witness
stand as defendant's witness, Dr. Sturdy recalled having made
a statement somewhat to t~at effect (R. 732, 719), and admitted that the 1vfintrate .birds did not look good, but looked
"rough," (R. 727), as compared with the Larro birds, that
there were many culls and the birds were thin and that the
consumption of too many oats to which the chickens had free
access at all times in the self-feed program may well have
been the cause of plaintiff's troubles (R. 732-735).
There was none of the conflicting expert testimony that
is ordinarily offered in cases of this type. See for example
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 280 Ky. 845, 134 S.W. (2d)
936 (1939) concerning a feed for dairy cows; and Crouch v.
National Livestock Remedy Co. et al., 205 Iowa 51, 217 N.W.
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55 7 ( 1928) where the testimony of the veterinarians was conflicting, but the court held that evidence that the hog remedy
in question had resulted in the death of hogs was sufficient to
carry the case to the jury on the question of proximate cause.
Plaintiff's additional items of proof tending to show
proximate causation may be briefly summarized as follows:
1. The fact that plaintiff used Mintrate only for one
seperately kept portion of his chickens, and ,that none of the

symptoms complained of developed in the non-11intrate
chickens; see Crouch v. National Livestock Remedy Co., supra,
where the plaintiff kept one bunch of hogs in a separate pen
and did not feed the remedy to them by the same method of
forced feeding, and these hogs did not get sick.
2. The testimony of two experts in the feed and poultry

business, Mr. \Vood and Mr. Bryson, that the l\fintrate birds
were getting thin and that their eggs were not up to standard
(R. 244-245, 247, 356-357, 359).
3.. The testimony of all the officers and agents of defendant company who observed plaintiff's two sets of chickens, including the testimony of the superintendent of defendant's experimental farm, Mr. Mittelberg, to the effect that the birds on
the Mintrate feed were thin and in poor C(")ndition, that their
egg production fell off and many died as a result of cannibalism which broke out about one month after plaintiff put
them on defendant's feed and about one week after he first
noticed their loss of weight; permitting the inference that
they were all convinced that the Mintrate on the self-feed plan
was the cause of the cannibalism, the deaths and the loss of
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egg production (R. 807-809, 287-288, 417-424). See for
example 11ittelberg's letter to Gail Barron of September 1,
1948 in which he stated with reference to plaintiff's Mintrate
birds:
rtlrrithout eating the tn·oper amount of scratch their
pbyJic,;/ co.:zd.:tion fell off and cannibalism developed.
You have heard the saying: 'You can lead a horse to
\Yater but you can't make him drink.' Here it seems
we might change that saying: 'You can feed scratch
but you can't make them eat it!" ( R. 809) ,

blaming the feeding method for the cannibalism and the
general deterioration of the chickens, on a slightly different
theory from that of Dr. Sturdy, who expressed the opinion
that the overdose of oats was the cause of plaintiff's losses.
4. The fact that a few days after August 28, when Mr.
Mittelberg visited plaintiff's farm, he changed the general
instructions with respect to the self-feed method, limiting and
discouraging its use (R. 804, 434-436). See also his letter of
September 1 in which he further stated:
"Whenever poultrymen are .using the laying mash
and scratch system of feeding it seems advisable to
recommend the use of our Mintrate mix in a laying
mash instead of self-feeding it,"
and
"Some who are now using the self-feed plan may get
better production if they would revert to the scratch
and mash system" (R. 809). _
5. Defendant's own evidence showing that any testing of
the new Mintrate product that the company may have undertaken was wholly inadequate and insufficient and in no way
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justified the claims that were made for the product on the selffeed method (R. 626-635, 825).
6. Expert testimony that the self-feed method should not
be recommended, and that in any event it should be approached
with caution (R. 767, 762, 362, 382), all of which tends to
prove that the method has not as yet passed its experimental stage and should not have been unconditionally released to the public.
7. Dr. Draper's testimony that cannibalism in a situation

like the present must be caused by faulty nutrition (R. 774).
8. The opinion of defendant's expert witnesses Dr. Draper
and Dr. Elmslie that the composition and ingredients of a
feed might be harmless without assuring that the feed is good
from the standpoint of improving the growth and production
of chickens (R. 766, 644-645).

9. Expert testimony that the feeding of unlimited amounts
of oats is harmful to chickens, and that laying hens require
varying rations of feed depending upon the percentage of
their egg production, both of which are recognized principles of
nutrition which were not followed in defendant's self-feed program (R. 7~4-735, 757, 648, 768-770, 816-817).
10. The testimony of three other poultry farmers who fed
Mintrate on the self-feed plan to some of their chickens of
similar ages for similar lengths of time with similar unsuccessful
experiences, including low egg production, severe picking and
cannibalism (R. 462, 559, 587).
62

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This evidence which is discussed in greater detail in the
Statement of Facts above, it is submitted, is amply sufficient
to sustain the verdict of the jury with respect to proximate
cal!sation in the case at bar.
Authorities very much in point are i1liller Z1• Economy Hog
& (;.,;tie Fuznier Co., 228 Iowa 626, 293 N.W. 4 (1940) holding that the testimony of veterinarians was sufficient to sustain
a verdict that the death of sheep was proximately caused by
defendant's stock powder; and Crouch v. National Livestock
Remedy Co., et al. supra, holding that in an action against
H. C. Moorman doing business under the name of "National
Live Stock Remedy Company (not Inc.) " to recover damages
for the death of hogs the question of proximate cause was
properly left to the jury. See also Swift & Co. v. Redhead,
147 Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140 which held that the evidence
sustained a finding that a certain cattle feed was not suitable
for fattening cattle, as represented, but was injurious· to the
cattle so fed.
Appellant's main argument appears to be that there are
numerous causes of sickness and deaths in the poultry business,
that death or loss of production in chickens may occur "without apparent reason," and that consequently plaintiff's losses
must have resulted from something not connected with the
feed. For support of its contention appellant relies heavily
on testimony purportedly given by Mr. Conta at R. 341; Mr.
Conta, however, did not make any such statement at that page
of the Record nor at any other page that respondent has been
able to find. Appellant also refers to some testimony by
plaintiff, which 1s, however, merely to the effect that there
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are diseases among chickens and that plaintiff has had experience with some of them (R. 192-193).
Respondent does not deny that chickens, like all living
creatures, are susceptible to disease and other hazards not
necessarily, though often, related to their feeding. Instruction :No. 5 covers this point fully, giving ample consideration to defendant's position. But it does not go as
far as to state what appellant apparently had in mind, that
chickens ~'just die'' or go off production without any determinable cause. To attempt to escape liability in this fashion by
a plain denial of the principle of causation is a new type of
defense not known to the law as yet. If this is not the meaning of appellant's contention, then its argument appears to be
reduced to the claim that disease or some similar factor
must have caused plaintiff's losses, without attempting to put
its finger on any particular disease or cause which would exclude the nutritional factor as the only proximate cause of
plaintiff's damage.
Not only is there no evidence that there was any other
cause that might have resulted in plaintiff's loss, but
there is positive proof to the effect that plaintiff's chickens were not diseased, neither on June 1, 1948, when the
2,850 pullets were moved over to the east side of the road
(Conta R. 307-310), nor in the end of August, 1948 when
Dr. Sturdy saw them and made some post mortem examinations. There is not the slightest evidence that plaintiff's
chickens had any sicknesses after they entere~ the laying
stage, except for a possible few cases of "b~g liver," and the
.Newcastle disease, which did, however, not hit the birds before
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November, close to the December cut-off date after which
plaintiff was not permitted to prove any loss. As has been
pointed out in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Sturdy did not
positively diagnose any case of big liver in plaintiff's flock,
and further stated that this disease does not spread readily
and is usually limited to a few birds in a flock (R. 743, 729730. As far as Newcastle is concerned, it has been explained in the Statement of Facts that any losses caused by this
disease are automatically excluded from plaintiff's claim for
damages because plaintiff asked to recover only those losses in
excess of losses in the Larro birds, and the Larro birds were
afflicted with Newcastle almost to the same extent as the other
chickens.
Appellant also mentions chicken-pox, tracheitis, and pullorum. As has been shown in the Statement of Facts, plaintiff's
chickens had chicken-pox and tracheitis in April, 1948 when
they were 2¥2 months old, and at that time a number of them
died therefrom (R. 193, 199). There was evidence to the
effect that they had no more trace of these diseases when
they entered upon egg production and that generally
these diseases do not recur in the same flock, particularly where
chickens have been vaccinated as was here the case. Dr.
Sturdy did not find any case of these diseases. There was
also evidence that none of the chickens had pullorum, a disease
which today is largely controlled at the hatcheries and the
baby chicks are tested before they enter the State of Utah
(R. 193).
As far as the "picking" is concerned, in the severe form
of cannibalism, the evidence discloses that it is not a disease, but
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a vice or habit (R. 726, 758), and that in the case at bar it
was not an independent cause, but rather a link in the chain
of causation. In other words, severe picking and cannibalism
was caused by the Mintrate feed and feeding method which
made the birds thin and restless, and the cannibalism in turn
led to the death and loss of production of many of the Mintrate chickens. This is clearly established by the evidence
of Dr. Draper (R. 774) and of Mr. Mittelberg (R. 809).
It is submitted that under the evidence none of the diseases or other hazards have in any way been proved to have
been a possible cause of plaintiff's losses. The correctness
of the principle is not disputed that where the evidence points
with equal force to two causes, only one of which makes the
defendant liable, the plaintiff must fail. But respondent
is at a .loss to find any evidence pointing to any second cause
of loss in the case at bar in addition to defendant's feed and
feeding method.

Appellant further insists that the testimony of the three
·poultry men with similar unsuccessful experiences was not
sufficient to prove proximate causation. Appeltant relies on
Crouch v. National Livestock Co., .rupra, where the court held,
however, that there was substantial evidence to find proximate
causation. The testimony of others whose hogs had also died
after eating the same hog remedy was held inadmissible but
not primarily on the ground of remoteness stated by appellant,
but for the main reason that the hog powder used by them
was different in color; coarseness, and chemical analysis.
In Economy Hog & Cattle Co. v. Compton, ____ Ind. ____ ,

132 N.E. 642 (1921), and 135 N.E. 1 (1922), evidence of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sickness of other hogs caused by the same powder was held to be
admissible and the Supreme Court of Indiana stated:
"We. do not understand that appellants are contending that it is not competent to show like effects of
the powder on other hogs under like conditions. \Ve
find no objection when the other owners testified. We
also find that the testimony in defense is largely made
up by farmers who had used this powder and thought
it all that appellants claimed for it. It would hardly
be safe to- confine the case to the scientific proposition
of the chemical analysis and mechanical mixture of
the powder, and the effect which the combination
would have upon hogs. This must be especially true
where the symptoms are all objective. Hogs do not
speak our language."
The testimony of other similar users of the Mintrate feed was
introduced as supplementary evidence only, to be. considered in addition to the great amount of other more direct
proof. The jury must have clearly understood the nature of
this evidence under the cautioning Instruction No. 4.
Appellant's rebuttal testimony, however, cannot have
carried much weight. In the first place, both witnesses,
one of whom was an employee of the defendant company
(R. 776) started to use Mintrate only in June and July, -1949,
about one year after Park bought it, and after the proceedings
in this case had long been com_menced. Secondly, appellant
admits that the company requested Barker to make a test
which may have led the jury to believe that the experiment was staged for purposes of use as evidence in the expected trial. And finally, Mr. Barker, who had a flock of 6,500
chickens, did not risk more than 500 on the Mintrate
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plan, and although he claimed that the Mintrate program was very successful and saved him a great deal of
grinding and mixing which he used to do by himself,
he intimated that he was not ready to put his other 6,000
chickens also on the new feeding plan.
In connection with appellant's reference to Wigmore
on Evidence on p. 56 and 57 of its brief, respondent merely
wishes to state that in the case at bar plaintiff did not have
the burden of proving "general or usual tendency" or "certainty or inevitableness" of results, but merely the fact that
his own chickens died or became incapacitated as a proximate
result of defendant's feed.
Plaintiff does not claim that there are any harmful
ingredients in the feed, nor that it has any composition other than that stated on its bag. But plaintiff does
contend that the mere fact of its chemical purity and correct
composition does not prove that the feed as such is good or
beneficial for laying hens, nor that the particular feeding
method adopted by defendant is good or beneficial for chickens.

POINT NO. V

EXHIBIT C WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
The Court instructed the jury that Exhibit C may be
considered only for the purpose of determining whether oral
representations had been made; and that no recovery could be
had under the writing itself· because proof of comparative
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feed costs had not been made as required under its terms.
(Instruction No. 2).
This Exhibit guarantees to plaintiff the production of "an
equal amount of eggs" by the Mintrate birds as is produced
by the Larro birds. As has been pointed out before under
Point No. II, a representation that 65ro egg production had
always been achieved means nothing more than that good
or satisfactory results have been obtained. It relates to the
same general subject matter as the "equal production clause"
of Exhibit C. It is submitted that the fact that this document
was written and signed by defendant's agent Gail Barron,
whether he had authority to make a _guaranty or not, is evidence
of the fact t._l].at he made oral representations relating to egg
production on the 1fintrate plan, and that Exhibit C was properly admitted in evidence for the limited purpose stated in
tL~e instruction.
The admission of the Exhibit did not in any way harm
defendant's cause. On the contrary, it helped defendant in two
particulars: ( 1) it caused the idea to prevail that something
more had to be proved than implied authority of Barron to
make oral representations, that proof of express authority
might be required; and ( 2) it influenced the computation of
damages to such an extent that instead of applying the ordinary rules of damages for breach of warranty, plaintiff's recovery was limited to the "money difference" between the
Mintrate birds and the Larro birds, as provided in Exhibit C.
Thus, instead of receiving compensation on the basis of the
15 32 Mintrate birds aCtually lost through deaths and culling,
damages were computed on the basis of a loss of only 1144
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birds after deducting a number equalling the percentage of
losses in the Larro birds. Plaintiff does not criticize this computation for the reason that all normal losses not attributable
to the feed are thereby absorbed and any possible intervening
cause is automatically excluded from consideration. He merely
wishes to point out that this theory was adopted and maximum
recovery was reduced as a direct result of the admission of
Exhibit C.

POINT NO. VI
THE THEORY OF DAMAGES ADOPTED BY THE
COURT IS CORRECT.
A. The Court correctly permitted recovery, in the ab-

sence of ascertainable market value, of the cost of replacements
in plaintiff's flock (with deductions for added egg yield),
plus loss of egg production during the interim before replacements could be made (with deduction of cost of producing
eggs), less amounts received from the sale of culls.
Appellant in its brief (at pages 62-67) has taken the
last sentence of paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 18 from its
context in an attempt to prove that the Court allowed a
double recovery of damages. Quoting this sentence relating
to the loss of egg yield, appellant contends that in addition
to the full market value of the lost chickens, plaintiff was
permitted to recover the loss of profits from eggs which these
chickens would have produced. This, if is submitted, is based
on a thorough misconstruction and misinterpretation of the
70

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instructions given by the Court and of the facts in the Record
showing plaintiffs computation of his damages. The Court's
theory of damages cannot be gathered from the one sentence
quoted by appellant, but can only be understood from some
of the facts in the Record and from a reading of Instructions
No. 17 and 18 in their entirety.
The difficulty the Court was confronted with was similar
to that experienced by the Court in the case of S~ A. Gerrard
Co. z·. Fricker, 42 Ar. 503, 27 P. (2d) 678 ( 1934) relied
upon by appellant, where no precedent was available announcing the rule of damages properly applicable to the destruction
and injury to a colony of bees. The Court stated:
"We think the rule must be the one ordinarily applied for the destruction qf or injury to personal property in general. This rule we find is: 'Definite rules
which will measure the extent of recovery in all cases
even of a partic}.llar class are difficult to formulate
owing to the consideration which must be given in
each case to its specific and perhaps peculiar surrounding circumstances .. .' 17 C. J. 844, sec. 166."
After reviewing the evidence in the light of this general principle the Court in that case found that the damage could be
readily computed and concluded that a measure of damages
based upon the market value of· the colonies at the time of the
damage could be adopted, with additional allowances for
extra work and feeding of the bees.
In the case at bar, Instruction No. 18, par 2 announces
the same rule of damages to the effect that plaintiff cannot
recover any more than
71
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an· amount that will correspond to the market value
of the chickens which died and which were culled at

11

the time and place of the death and culling thereof, or
a reasonable time thereafter, less the amount received
by the plaintiff for the sale of the culls.'' (Emphasis
supplied).
This is the basic instruction with respect to the amount of
damages in the case at bar. It allows no recovery beyond the

market value of the lost chickens. It does not permit any
additional recovery for the loss of profits from the dettd
chickens. However, in the case at bar, there was the added
difficulty which distinguishes it from the Gerrard Co. case above
that the market value of chickens of the ages of the Mintrate
birds could not be directly ascertained.

The evidence is un-

disputed to the effect that laying hens above the age of five
months are not generally available on the market because at
five months they begin to produce eggs so that people who
have raised them to that age will not sell them then because
they are so valuable for egg production. (See the expert
testimony of Earl Wood R. 370-371 and of Keith Bryson
R. 247, 258). Also, since chickens are brooded only during
certain months of the year, even five-months old pullets are
not available on the market at all times (R. 259). Consequently the market value of the lost chickens had to be arrived at by a process of indirection. The formula employed
by the Court to this end is the same as that used by the Utah
courts and many other courts in case of destruction of a building where there is also no ascertainable market value.
In Egelhoff tJ, Ogden City, 71 Utah 511 (1928), for example, the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
72
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"It has been held by this court that the measure of
damages for the destruction of a house is the rcost to
reprodttre it, and the value of its use while that Wtl.f
being done.' l\1arks l'. Crt/mer, 6 Utah 419 . . ."
(Emphasis supplied).
See also Kennedy z·. Treleaz'en, 103 Kan. 651, 275 Pac. 977,
7 A.L.R. 274, also holding that the cost of replacing the
building is the best measure of damages in cases of that kind,
stating:
"There is no universal test for determining the
value of property injured or destroyed and the mode
and amount of proof must be adapted to the facts
of each case . . .
It is frequently said that the market value of the
property described at the time and place of the fire
is a proper measure, and this is true if the property in
fact has a market value. If there be no market value,
then another criterion of value must be found, and
the best evidence which can be obtained, must be produced to show the elements which enter into real
value."
This rule of damages based on replacement cost plus use
value is not limited to the destruction of buildings, but is
also applied in case of destruction of personal property having
no market value. 15 Am. Jur., Damages, sec. 15. The formula is the same as the measure of damages applied in many
cases of injury to personal property. Compare, for example,
Bergstrom v. Mellen, 57 Utah 42, 192 Pac. 679 ( 1920), and
Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 Pac. 676 ( 1920) holding
that in an action for damages to an automobile recovery may
be had for the reasonable costs of repair, plus any deprecia73
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tion m market value after repairs are completed, plus- ~he
reasonable use of the car during the period the plaintiff was
deprived of its use. Cf Gardner v. Airway Motor Coach Lines,
---- Utah ____ , 166 P. (2d) 196 ( 1946).
In accordance with these authorities, the third paragraph
of Instruction No. 18 states that as a substitute for the market
value of the lost hens the jury may use the "cost of replacement
plus temporary loss of use" formula, with the necessary adjustments due to the fact that fiVe-months old pullets have to
be fed and cared for for at least two months before they are
mature, but on the other hand produce eggs for two additional months. The item of "loss of use" during the period
before replacements can be made in the case at bar consists
of temporary loss of egg production.
That this element of "loss of use" for a temporary period,
even where it takes the form of a temporary loss of profits,
has nothing in common with a claim for loss of future profits,
is held in Horace F. Wood Transfer Co. v. Shelton, 180 Ind.
273, 101 N. E. 718 ( 1913) which was an action for damages

to a carriage and a team of horses. The Court stated:
"In its seventeenth instruction the court told the
jury in assessing damages, if it should find fo! ~h_e
plaintiffs, it might consider 'whether the plamtl~s
were for any period of time deprived of the use of sa~d
horse and cab by reason of any injury sustained to sa1d
horse and cab in said collision, and the reasonable
value for the use of said cab and horse during said
period of time, all as shown by the evidence in the
case.' This ir:str~ction is .manifes!ly not open to
appellant's obJeCtton that tt permttted the jury to
74
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J"'' ..-geJ for .wch .rpeclllt~til'e loss ,,J might tiCewe in :/.·;; ::tfitrt· by reason of the lessened value of
the injured horse and cab. Fairly interpreted, and
especi~iity in the light of all the evidence given ~n the
rn.1~, ti1/J iusttuction Jimply told the jm·y that Nl de!trmining the rpteJtion of d.IIJJdge.r. if "~'Y· it 111<(111
(/SJeJJ

'.·~···>
..

~

.

co!IJ::jer the reaJ(JJJ,Jbie l'.t:':H of t/;,• !tJe of the cttb dJ!tt

Juring the f'a.:ud lit t'c'JJ1iiJ' in !r/J,;c/J tO repatt'
the injuries causeJ by the collision. There was no evidence before the jury of any loss which was not past,
certain, and known at the time of the trial;" (Emphasis
supplied.)
bur.L.'

The Court also held that evidence showing that the plaintiff
lost $5 to $7 a day for a two-months period because he was
deprived of the use of the horse and carriage was not
open to the objection that it sought to set up speculative profits,
stating that it only

:m

.......

;:

"tended to show probable profits which might have
been received not as the measure of damages, but to
aid the jury in estimating damages."
The three cases relied upon by appellant on pages 64-67
of its brief are all distinguishable on the ground that the
animals lost there had an ascertainable market value so that
the ordinary rule of loss or depreciation of market v_alue
could be applied. Also, there was evidence that the future
profits claimed in those cases were truly speculative as for
example a claim for the increase of a bee colony which, the
court said, was "too much of a guess to be the basis of a
claim for damages." In one of the three cases, Miller v.
Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co., 228 Iowa 693, 293
N.W. 4 (1940), the Court recognized that damages might
be recovered for the temporary loss of use by an animal, stating:
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"The damage resulting from injury to an animal is
the difference in value before and after the injury. There
may be other elements of damage such as expense of
treatment or temporary loss of use or of produce. But
whether the animal is injured or destroyed the total
damages ordinarily recoverable may not exceed its
value prior thereto." (Emphasis supplied).
McCormick on Damages ( 1935), p. 477, takes issue with the
last sentence quoted, stating that

"If in fact the cost of repair, including loss of use exceeds the value of the chattel, there should be no hard
and fast rules fixing that value as the maximum recovery.''
Respondent does not have to be concerned with this rule, however, because in the first place there is no ascertainable value
\Vhich may not be exceeded, and secondly, the total price of
five-months old pullets if bought to replace the older and more
valuable hens of plaintiff already amounted to $2,033.44 after
deduction of $540.56 received for the culls so that under
the totai verdict of $2,231.34, less than $200.00 was allowed
to cover the temporary loss of egg production and the other
items intended to be allowed under Instruction No. 18.

(See

Exhibit V).
Plaintiff's summary of his computation of damages appears on the typewritten Exhibit V (introduced in evidence
at R. 67 4) .

After this document was admitted, two more

figures were subtracted from the total-$53.94 for overhead
saved with respect to the chickens which had died or had been
culled (R. 691), and $1,235.52 for feeding costs saved with
r<i:spect to the same chickens (R. 859).
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Detailed evidence substantiating plaintiff's claim of losses
appears on pages 527-5-B, 574-585, 654-675, and 682-691 of
the Record. A great part of this evidence consists of testimony of Mr. l\1ille~, who worked for plaintiff and personally
made most of the entries on the daily eggcharts which contain
complete figures on egg production and counts of chickens.
The market price of five-months old pullets and of eggs was
testified to by two poultry experts, Mr. Wood and Mr.
Bryson (R. 246, 370). Amounts received for culls bought
by Mr. Conta for the Utah Poultry Company were proved by
the receipts given by that Company (R. 575-579).
Plaintiff's computation of damages may be summarized
as follows:
Original number of 1\fintrate birds ________________________ 2,850
Number left on Dec. 4, 1948 ________________________________ 1,318
Absolute loss (including deaths and culls) __________ 1,5 32
Number that should have been left if lost at same
rate as Larro ------------------------------------------------------2,462
Number actually left ---------------------------------------· ______ 1, 318
Relative loss (in excess of Larro) ________________________ 1, 144

Price of 1,144 pullets 5 months old at $2.25
per pullet ------------------------· ---------------------------$2,5 74.00
Minus price received for 744 culls at $0.74
per cull -------------------------------------------------------- 540.56
$2,033.44
Plus cost of feeding 5-months old pullets until
mature ----------------------------------------------------------- 822.54
$2,855.98
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Minus added egg yield of 5-months old pullets 1,308.90
$1,547.08
Plus egg loss up to assumed replacement date
(Dec. 9, 1948) -------------------------·------------------ 1,973. 70
Minus overhead saved on lost hens________________

$3,520.78
53.94

$3,466.84
Minus feeding costs saved on lost hens __________ 1,235.52
$2,231.~·2

It will be noted that this computation is in accord with In-

structions No. 17 and 18, and the additional Instruction given
on page 859 of the Record. The arrangement of the figures
on Exhibit V is slightly different, but the result is the same.
It is submitted that the theory of damages adopted by the
Court and the computation of damages thereunder is correct.
Respondent does wish to add, however, that a recovery
of $2,231.32 under the total verdict of the jury by no means
compensates him for the total amount of his loss. The reason is that he was unable to replace the lost hens and thereby
minimize his damages as the Court ruled as a matter of law
he should have done not later than December 4, 1948 (R. 538).
That laying hens of the same age and breed as those he lost
were not available on the market, has been pointed out before.
It is possible that he might have been able to buy some fivemonths old pullets, assuming that he could h_ave found them
in the numbers and at the times needed and had the capital to
purchase them. Assuming then that he could have acquired
78

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

younger replacement birds, he would, however, have been confronted with innumerable problems of management, feeding
and accommodation. The following January when his new crop
of baby chicks would have come in, he would have had three
flocks of three different ages, with the replacement birds still
in the best part of the laying stage at a time when the new
chicks would have been ready for egg production and required more space. As lvir. Park testified, he chose the month
of January ~s the starting point of his business cycle after
some years of experimentation because January chicks will
reach the peak of egg production in October and November
when egg prices are highest (R. 703). Then, about January
of the next year, he starts to cull out the older flock to make
room for the new ones. When the new ones go into the laying
pens, more of the old hens are culled out until, about October,
all of the flock of the preceding year has been disposed of,
and the cycle starts again. In view of these facts, it is clear
that the presence of a third flock would have been difficult
and impractical for Mr. Park to handle, under the particular
set-up of his poultry business.
A more realistic rule of damages might have been
to regard plaintiffs losses not like the loss of a few
individual chickens kept by a family for its household
use, but rather as damages suffered in his poultry business, or, in an analogy to the loss of an annual crop, as losses
sustained by his annual flock of chickens. Viewed in this
fashion, damages would not be assessed upon the basis of the
individual chickens lost, ·but rather upon the loss of egg production over the entire laying period. Compare Cleary v.
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Shand, 48 Utah 640, 161 P. 453 ( 1916); Sharp v. Gianulakis,
63 Utah 249, 225 P. 3·37 ( 1924); Vincent v. Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley, 109 Utah 191, 167 P. (2d) 279 (1946).
That profits lost as the result of the breach of warranty of
feed for animals may be recovered similar to profits lost from
a growing crop, is suggested in Swift & Co. v. Redhead, 147
Iowa 94, 122 1\f.W. 140 ( 1909). Cf Miller v. Economy Hog and
Cattle Powder Co., 228 Iowa 693, 293 N.W. 4 (1940) where
the Court intimated that where future profits are contemplated as the immediate fruits of a warranty of animal feed,
they can be recovered.
Respondent is of the opinion that under any such theory
under which the plaintiff's loss would be figured on the basis
of the eggs which are the product of his business rather than
the chickens which constitute merely his capital investment,
he would have received a more just and fair amount of compensation. The present verdict does not allow him even as
much as the full market value of $2,574.00 for 1144 young
pullets which are admittedly much less valuable than his mature
laying hens. In this connection attention is called to defendant's requested Instruction No. 11 (R. 70) which was not
given, in which defendant suggests that damages be awarded
on the basis of an imaginary market price of $2.80 per chicken,
which would amount to a total of $3,203.20 for the 1144
chickens lost. After deducting the $540.56 received for the
culls the total amount of damages to be awarded would still be
$2,662.64, well above the present verdict of $2,231.32.

B. The evidence with respect to the temporary loss of egg
production was sufficiently definite and certain.
80
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It is true that plaintiff experienced some difficulties jn
proving his damages. That was due to the fact that as a
farmer, he does not keep elaborate books and he did not have
the assistance of an accountant in preparing his figures for
the trial. Furthermore, his proof was complicated by the
fact that he did not pray damages for his absolute loss in
.Mintrate birds, but solely for his relative loss in excess of
Larro losses necessitating many computations on a percentage
basis; and finally the theory of damages adopted by the Court
due to the fact that the market value of the lost chickens
could not be directly established, resulted in an involved
method of figuring out feeding costs, overhead, egg production
gains and losses, and similar items described above under A.
It is submitted that the average price of $15.00 a case
was a proper figure to use in the computation of the value of
the eggs lost. Plaintiff did not rely on the estimate of Mr.
Miller to that effect, as appellant claims, but the price of eggs
was testified to by the poultry expert Mr. Keith Bryson, who
had bought all of plaintiff's eggs (R. 245-246). 1fr. Bryson
stated that eggs of young pullets sell for a little less, but that
the average throughout the fall season of 1948 was $15.00
a case (a case consisting of 30 dozen) . Plaintiff himself
testified from the actual sales figures that he received 41.2
cents a dozen on the average for the eggs of his young pullets
who had just started to lay up to August 20 (R. 686, 695),
and therafter prices went up and the eggs got larger so that
50 cents a dozen or $15.00 a case is a fair average. Appellant
had the opportunity to controvert this figure by bringing in
evidence of its own, but failed to do so.
81
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It is difficult to understand how appellant can claim,
in the face of plaintiff's computation of damages showing a
deduction of as much as $1,235.52 for savings in feeding
costs and $53.94 for savings in overhead, that no allowance
has been made for either one of these items (see pages 7174 of appellant's brief). The jury was charged specifically
in Instruction No. 17 that in determining the temporary losses
in egg production, plaintiff may recover "the value of the eggs
less the cost of producing the same," and in Instruction No.
17 the Court stated, after overhead had already been deducted
before arriving at the total of $3,466.84 '(R. 691), that

"the cost of. feeding hens is in evidence and it is
necessary for you to deduct from the figure that the
plaintiff gave you, of $3,466.84, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that you should use such
figures, the cost of feeding the chickens that plaintiff
did not feed during the period that he claims he had a
reduced egg production."
And at page 859 of the Record the Court instructed the jury
that plaintiff
"would not be entitled to an egg lay without deducting
the money he would have had to pay to feed the
chickens,''
and submitted to the jury the stipulated figure of $1,235.52
"as the plaintiff's feeding cost, leaving a balance of $2,231.~4."
The maximum permitted recovery after deducting the
$1,235.52 was, however, not inserted into the Instruction,
leaving the higher maximum of $3,466.84, with the above82
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quoted additional charge of Instruction No .• 17 to the effect
that the feeding costs must still be deducted. The Document
"Judgment on the Verdict" also carried the $3,466.84 maximum figure, listing a maximum of $1,973.70 allowable for
egg loss. The jury, sent out with this document and with a
figure of $L2Y:'l.52 to be deducted for feeding costs, naturally
deducted most of the feeding cost from the amount allowed
for the chickens, instead of from the egg loss, ending up
correctly with a maximum verdict of $2,231.34, but allowing
$1.672.00 for eggs and only $558.93 for chickens. Of course,
under the theory of damages adopted by the Court a subdivision of the damages into chicken loss and loss of egg
yield was not necessary and might have been avoided, but
it is submitted that the arrangement of the figures was not
material and had not the slightest effect on the ultimate
result of the case.
With respect to the amount of $540.56 deducted for
overhead, attention is called to pages 687-691 showing how
plaintiff arrived at that figure. His feeding costs were also
testified to at length in the tria1 ( R. 579-5 81, 68 7) .
It is also submitted that in the case at bar there was nothing speculative or conjectural about the evidence introduced
to prove plaintiff's temporary loss of egg production. In
connection with appellant's reference to the Annotation in
99 A.L.R. 938 relating to prospective profits of new businesses,
it may be stated that not only did plaintiff have- provable
data of his past poultry business, but better than that, his
egg losses could be rationally arrived at, without guessing
or speculation, through a -comparison with the egg pro83
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duction of the Larro birds, which was a simultaneous
absolutely equal venture. The Court found the ideal
situation that the basis of comparison was provided by
the plaintiff himself through the division of his flock. See
the Annotation in 69 A.L.R. 748 ( 1930) entitled "Loss of
or damages to crop as element of damages for breach of
contract of sale or warranty of agricultural machinery or
fertilizer." Some of the cases listed in this annotation refer
to facts similar to the case at bar where, for example, defective fertilizer had been used only on part of a plaintiff's
land and not on the other. The court in a case like that held
that the "actual experiment that was made relieved the damages of any objection based on the idea of their being speculative or contingent." Wolcott v. Mount, 13 Am. Rep. 438;
Bell v. Reynolds, 78 Ala. 511; Philbrick v. Kendall, 111 Me.
198, 88 Atl. 540 ( 1913); and Swift & Co. v. Redhead, 147
Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140, stating that a claim for profits lost
through breach of warranty in the sale of a cattle feed is
not subject to the objection that it is speculative or uncertain.
Finally, in answer to appellant's objection to the use of
plaintiffs own figures, which are, however, all based on the
egg charts introduced in evidence, the case of Stuart v. Burlington County Farmers' Exchange, 101 Atl. 265 ( 1917)
is referred to where the plaintiffs oral testimony with
respect to the amounts of his sales of a crop and losses
sustained was held competent evidence, and also Rabinowitz
v. Hawthorne, ____ N.J. ____ , 98 Atl. 315 ( 1916).
C. The procedure in the trial with respect to proof was
not prejudicial to defendant's cattse.
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I.

There was nothing in the procedure in the trial court
that was prejudicial to defendant's cause. On the contrary,
the Court was most exacting, strictly requiring plaintiff to
make his proof of damages air tight, so that as a result
plaintiff had to labor over his figures and problems of
arithmetics while defendant could sit by relying on the Court
to check the minutest details of the proof. Furthermore,
the Court on its own, without any motion or request by defendant, compelled plaintiff to make one deduction after the
other from his claim for damages, and on one day even told
him that a non-suit would be granted if additional .figures
for further deductions were not brought in within five minutes
(R. 680-681) . The Court also on its own initiative cut off
all of plaintiff's damages after Dec. 9, 1948 (R. 538) without plaintiff having an opportunity to show that it would be
impractical and inexpedient for him to replace the lost chickens before the end of their laying period in the fall of 1949.
Reading the whole record and all the instructions .one
cannot but receive the impression that if any side was
helped by the Court, it was the defendant's rather than the
plaintiffs.

D. The Court gave complete instructions on the subject
of intervening causes and the plaintiff's duty to minimize
his losses.
As has been fully discussed above under Point IV relating to proximate cause, any normal losses in the Mintrate
pens not attributable to the feed have been automatically
excluded from consideration due to the fact that only extraordinary losses, that is those exceeding Larro losses have been
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included in plaintiffs computation of his damages. Instead
of claiming compensation for his absolute loss of 1532 birds,
only his relative loss of 1144 birds was considered, leaving
the balance of ~·88 chickens (for which even younger replacements would have cost $8?3.00) to be written off as
normal risks of the poultry business.
As has also been stated before, the Newcastle disease
did not become prevalent before November, 1948, not long
before the cut-off date of. December 9, 1948. While appellant claims that the disease broke out in the end of September
or October, the Record clearly shows, and the egg charts
prove, that the disease started in November, 1948 (R. 208).
Furthermore, Newcastle losses were experienced also by the
Larro birds, almost to the same extent as by the Mintrate
birds which suffered slightly more because of their previously
weakened condition caused by the defective nutrition. Consequently, under the relative loss theory, very slight, if any,
losses were counted during the period of the Newcastle
disease.·
The condition of "picking" has also been discussed before, particularly under Point No. IV. It suffices to repeat
that plaintiff does take the position, and the evidence in the
. record clearly proves, that the severe picking known as "cannibalism" or "pickouts," as disti~guished from the ordinary
feather picking which occurs in most flocks from time to time
without any serious consequences-was caused as a proximate
result of the Mintrate feed and feeding method. Any losses
occasioned by the cannibalism are the proximate result of
the Mintrate feed.
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Any intervening causes not automatically excluded
through the relative-loss method of co~puting damages are
covered by Instruction No. 19 which charges the jury to
consider any contingencies or diseases peculiar to the .Mintrate coops.
The duty to mm1m1ze damages is fully covered by Instruction No. 17. Also, as has been discussed before, the
Court ruled that under his duty to minimize his losses it
would be unreasonable as a matter of law for plaintiff to
recover for any losses beyond December, 1948 (R. 538).
Plaintiff spent whole days in the Mintrate pens painting the
birds with a salve to prevent further cannibalism, with considerable success. And although defendant again claims that
he did not see a veterinarian and again fails to mention its
own veterinarian, Dr. Sturdy, it must be repeated that Dr.
Sturdy made a special trip from Illinois to Utah to examine
plaintiff's birds. Dr. Sturdy, who saw that plaintiff used a
salve to stop the picking, had no other suggestion to make
to help this condition. According to Mr. Conta, debeaking
is a new method used by some poultry men to alleviate this
condition, but it does not help very much (R. 346), and it is
certainly not the only deterrent plaintiff should have used
to minimize his loss.
Plaintiff did not stop using Mintrate immediately when
he noticed its harmful effects because defendant's agent Gail
Barron requested him to give the feed a "fair trial" (R. 150,
420). However, when plaintiff was certain that the effects
of the feed were becoming disastrous, he discontinued
it immediately (R. 150). He changed back gradually to the
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other feeding program so that by September 1, 1948, his
chickens received no more Mintrate feed.
Appellant contends that plaintiff could have replaced
his damaged birds right then, in September or October, 1948.
In this connection attention is called to the following language
from S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 42 Ar. 503, 27 P. (2d)
678 ( 1934) relied on by appellant on page 64 of its· brief:
"We know of no rule of law that requires a person
whose property has been wrongfully injured to go into
the open market as the court states, and buy substitutes, or, as here 'other bees' in order to claim damages from the wrongdoer or to mitigate them."
Appellant suggests on page 83 of its brief that since the whole
flock was affected, plaintiff should have replaced his whole
flock. Appellant further states (p. 84 of its brief) that since
there was a ready market for chickens for meat in the fall
of 1948, and pullets up to the age of five months of age were
available for purchase, plaintiff should have disposed of his
whole flock and bought a new one of younger pullets, and
received damages for the difference. Even leaving aside the
fact that plaintiff would then have had less valuable nonlaying chickens, plaintiff would under defendant's own theory
of damages recover more than twice the amount of the present
verdict: He would have spent $6,412.50 to buy 2850 fivemonths old pullets at $2.25 per pullet; and assuming that
he would have had only half of his actual losses at that time,
or a loss of only 766 birds, he would have received only
$1,542.16 in a sale of the remaining 2,084 chickens for
meat at $0.74 a piece, leaving a balance to be awarded as
88
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damages in the total amount of $4,870.34. This figure does
not yet include an amount to compensate plaintiff for the
loss of "ten or twenty days' production as a result of changing
from one flock to another" which appellant suggests might
also be added.

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that no error was committed in the
trial court, and that its judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LOTHAIRE R. RICH
B. M. BODENHEIMER
Attorneys for Respondent.

89
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

